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OF COLLEGES AND KINGS: ACADEMIC

DEFENDANTS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
TODD
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INTRODUCTION

The Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified in section 1983 of title
42 of the United States Code (section 1983),' has developed into a
comprehensive remedy for those whose constitutional or legal
rights have been abridged by any "person" acting under color of
state law. 2 These persons most often have been police officers,
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C. Thomas Dienes for his advice and recommendations.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
2 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183-84 (1961); Lucom v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966). A plaintiff under § 1983 must prove two elements to recover:
first, he must show that he has been deprived of a right protected by either the Constitution
or the laws of the Unitdd States, and, second, that the defendant has deprived him of this
right " 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or
Territory.' This second element requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted
'under color of law.'" Adickes, 398 U.S. at 150; see also Edwards v. Vasel, 349 F. Supp. 164,
166 (E.D. Mo.) (wrongdoer must not only be clothed with state authority, he must use such
authority to deprive plaintiff of his rights in order for plaintiff to recover), aff'd, 469 F.2d
338 (8th Cir. 1972). Section 1983 is restricted to cases involving state wrongdoing and does
not apply to federal officials acting under federal law. See Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513,
517 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 (1972).
3 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961); Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 340
(10th Cir. 1966). When a state police officer denies a criminal suspect rights guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, that officer is subject to civil liability under §
1983. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1963). Federal courts have held the
following to be deprivations of rights by law enforcement officials that can give rise to §
1983 claims: illegal search and seizure, illegal arrest, detention without a warrant or arraignment, physical abuse, threats and intimidation, failure to provide needed medical attention,
and refusal to permit consultation with an attorney. Id. at 541 (citations omitted).
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state and local government officials,4 and public school officials. 5
One group of officials, however, has been largely excluded from the
development of section 1983 jurisprudence. When they are defendants in section 1983 actions, college officials and professors have
been treated by the courts as sui generis.6 The institutions themselves have been accorded what amounts to a "special status" by
7
the courts in such actions.
The solicitous treatment of colleges and universities runs
counter to the development of the section 1983 doctrine as applied
to other entities and officials. While the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have enlarged the liability of most governmental entities,8 a number of doctrines have been established that effectively
create an educational immunity in section 1983 actions. Individual
4 See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)
(local governments may be sued directly under § 1983); Bradford v. Edelstein, 467 F. Supp.
1361, 1375 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (§ 1983 action permitted against utilities board where defendant
acted pursuant to official policy); Bollen v. National Guard Bureau, 449 F. Supp. 343, 349
(W.D. Pa. 1978) (actions taken by National Guard officers in their official capacity subject to
§ 1983 review).
1 See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963); Kingsville Indep. School
Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. 1980); Burkey v. Marshall County Bd. of
Educ., 513 F. Supp. 1084, 1095 (N.D. W. Va. 1981).
e See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1978) (medical school's
decision to dismiss student on academic grounds not subject to judicial review); see Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449-50 (5th Cir.
1976); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974).
7 See, e.g., Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605, 610 (10th Cir. 1976) (action for damages
against state university barred because recovery would require expenditure from public
treasury); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 477 F.2d 1, 7 n.10 (3d Cir. 1973) (§ 1983
action impermissible against university qua state agency); Anthony v. Cleveland, 355 F.
Supp. 789, 789-90 (D. Hawaii 1973). Some courts have held the eleventh amendment to be a
bar to actions against a state university, see Prebble, 535 F.2d at 610, while at least one
court has held that a state university is not a "person" who can be sued under § 1983, see
Anthony, 355 F. Supp. at 789-90.
' See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIIL
RIGHTS ENFORcEMENT EFFORT 1 (1971). The courts have remedied many years of governmental indifference to civil rights through the application of the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. Id; cf. GINGER, THE LAW, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS
xvii (1977) (Warren Court protected citizens from unlawful actions of, inter alia, policemen,
school superintendents, and college presidents).
Section 1983, which was enacted during the post-Civil War reconstruction era, was seldom used as a remedy before 1961. See Comment, Civil Rights: The Supreme Court Finds
New Ways to Limit Section 1983, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 776, 777 (1981). In Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961), the Court abandoned the view that a litigant in a § 1983 action had to
prove an intentional invasion of a constitutional right. See id. at 187. Today, courts hold
that "liability [is] not dependent on the mind of the actor, but upon the result of the act."
Comment, supra, at 777-78. This new interpretation allows § 1983 to be used as a potent
tool to redress deprivations of rights caused by persons acting under color of state law.
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officials in academia have been treated differently from all other
section 1983 individual defendants. The qualified official immunity
rules devised by the Supreme Court in other contexts have seldom
been applied to academic officials.'
This Article is an examination of colleges and universities, and
also their individual officers, as defendants in section 1983 proceedings. Section I addresses the development of the special treatment accorded colleges and universities in section 1983 cases. Section II considers the types of actions that have been brought
against colleges and universities under section 1983; the nature of
the challenged action appears to make a difference in how these
defendants are treated under section 1983. Section III examines
the doctrinal foundation for granting educational institutions and
personnel a special status under section 1983; this special status
appears to have developed by analogy from other legal contexts.
Section III also analyzes recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
higher education issues. Section IV contains a summary of the
functions of section 1983 as they have been developed by the
courts, focusing on the various forms of official immunity. Section
V proposes an application of traditional section 1983 principles
generally, and immunity analysis in particular, to college and university defendants. By inference, Section V rejects the analyses
that have resulted in special status for academic defendants. This
section also discusses the potential benefits to be derived from
treating academic defendants like other section 1983 defendants.
A few notes on style and method are appropriate. The word
university is used throughout the text and is meant to include colleges. This Article does not concern itself with the "state action"
problem, for which plentiful literature exists. 10 The discussion as-

'

See infra notes 354-376 and accompanying text; see also C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVM
RIGHTS AcTs § 98 (2d ed. 1980). Officers and trustees of a university have been held to be
totally immune from § 1983 liability when exercising discretionary functions. See Kirstein v.
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 188 (E.D. Va. 1970); see also Rubenstein v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 422 F. Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Wis. 1976). But see
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (president of state university entitled to
only qualified immunity in § 1983 action); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605, 612 (10th Cir.
1976) (president, trustees, and officers of state university entitled to only qualified
immunity).
10 State action is a theory that is used to apply constitutional norms, particularly the
fourteenth amendment, to institutions over which the state exercises control. See Thigpen,
The Application of FourteenthAmendment Norms to Private Colleges and Universities,
11 J.L. & EDUC. 171, 171-72 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has identified five factors relevant in considering whether an institution may be the proper subject of
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sumes that state action applies to all universities and individuals
discussed.
I.

OF COLLEGES AND KINGS

It cannot be said that section 1983 has primary targets. Nevertheless, the classic defendants are police forces, local governments,
public schools and their respective officials. These institutions and
their officials dominate the majority of section 1983 cases. Although there are also many cases concerning universities and university officials, the similarity often ends there. Against governmental defendants, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
showing that the defendant caused the denial of constitutional or
legal rights while acting under color of law. 1 If there is no immunity available to the defendant, the plaintiff normally will prevail.
When a university or university official is the defendant, however,
the rules seem to change. The courts question whether an action
2
should be allowed against such a defendant in the first instance.'
a state action claim:
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is dependent on governmental
aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory scheme; (3)
whether that scheme connotes government approval of the activity or whether the
assistance is merely provided to all without such connotation; (4) the extent to
which the organization serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the
State; (5) whether the organization has legitimate claims to recognition as a "private" organization in associational or other constitutional terms.
Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 (2d Cir. 1975). A plaintiff, to recover, does not
have to state with particularity the exact types of control present; it is sufficient for the
complaint to show that in the aggregate, the defendant's action was state action. See Brown
v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir. 1970). The various indicia should be examined
through an inductive process to ascertain if state participation is sufficient to confer liability. See Rowe v. Chandler, 332 F. Supp. 336, 340 (D. Kan. 1971). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv.L. REv. 1045, 1056-64 (1968) (overview of
theories of state action). For a court to find state action, the state control must exceed mere
financial perpetuation of the institution. See Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593, 596 (10th
Cir. 1969). Furthermore, federal control or participation is entirely irrelevant when considering possible § 1983 liability. Id. at 595.
" See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981). Section 1983 has no requirement that
the defendant act with any specific state of mind. See Parratt,451 U.S. at 535; see also
Comment, supra note 8,at 777-78 (defendant should be liable under § 1983 for natural
consequences of his act, just as under traditional tort principles).
12 See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32"(2d Cir. 1974). The Faro
court hypothesized that "[o]f all fields, which the federal courts should hesitate to invade
and take over, education and faculty appointments at the University level are probably the
least suited for federal supervision." Id. But see Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150,
1153 (2d Cir.) ("common-sense" position of Faro should not be forced "beyond all reasonable limits"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:228

Plaintiffs encounter a greater burden of proof when academia is on
trial. Colleges and universities are allowed defenses that cannot be
found in the cases or treatises. Plaintiffs find themselves facing the
potent affirmative defense of "educational immunity."
Under the notion of educational immunity, the academic defendant has a choice of three defenses, either singly or in combination, that are unavailable to most other section 1983 defendants.
The first defense is the doctrine of "academic abstention," which
provides that courts should maintain a "hands-off" approach to
higher education. 13 The second defense often cited by the courts is
academic freedom. 4 A third academic defense is the assertion of
an educational purpose for the challenged action.'6 All three have
been invoked to defeat plaintiffs in section 1983 cases.' 6
Of these defenses, academic abstention is the most often cited
and the least analyzed. The concept of academic abstention, simply stated, is that courts should not inject themselves into controversies involving universities. 7 The major reason given for abstention is that university officials are peculiarly well-suited to make
academic decisions, while judges are particularly ill-suited.' 8 This
position stems from a number of sources, most notably a 72-yearold Massachusetts case decided under tort principles19 and an old
New York case decided under contract principles.20 From these
13See Connelly v. University of Vt., 224 F. Supp. 156, 161 (D. Vt. 1965); supra note 12;
infra notes 16-28 and accompanying text. See generally H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER
EDUCATION AND THE LAW 14-17 (1979) (discussing academic abstention).
"' See infra notes 29-45. Academic freedom is a concept that stresses that the learning,
teaching, and research functions of universities are to be free from governmental interference. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); H. EDWARDS & V.
NORDIN, supra note 13, at 163-64. The rationale underlying academic freedom is that the
service universities render to society "can be performed only in an atmosphere entirely free
from administrative . . . constraints." See Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at
1048.
1" See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. Universities have been given great leeway, including a presumption of being reasonable, when taking disciplinary action in the
name of promoting an "educational atmosphere." See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs
Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
16 In addition to the legal doctrines of academic abstention, academic freedom, and
educational purpose, it is submitted that courts simply forebear when universities are involved, reflecting a cultural or class-based bias.
1 See, e.g., Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231 (2d Cir. 1974).
18 See id.; Ray, Toward ContractualRights for College Students, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 163,
178-79 (1981).
"9Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 19, 102 N.E. 1095, 1096 (1913);
see infra note 26.
20 People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 108, 14 N.Y.S.
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cases, and similar cases in other jurisdictions, 21 courts have concluded that "the student-university relationship is unique, and it
should not be and cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal category."2 2
This statement clearly reveals its origins in the doctrine of in loco
parentis," although that doctrine is not applicable to universities. 24 The contention that judges are peculiarly ill-suited to consider academic questions is weak. The federal judiciary regularly
hears cases containing complicated scientific and economic evidence. 25 By contrast, the evidence in academic cases tends to be
relatively simple.
Academic abstention has been relied upon primarily in cases
in which students are dismissed for academic reasons, 26 but has
490, 490 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't), aff'd, 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (1891).
21 See, e.g., Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 100, 120 N.W. 589,

591 (1909) (students' rights to admission depend on implied contract; court will not issue
writ of mandamus to compel college to readmit students); Tate v. North Pac. College, 70 Or.
160, 165, 140 P. 743, 745 (1914) (matriculation is a contract between college and student
such that student must comply with contract terms to receive degree; court will not review
discretionary refusal by college to issue degree); State ex rel. Burg v. Milwaukee Medical
College, 128 Wis. 7, 14-15, 106 N.W. 116, 118 (1906) (court will not issue mandamus to force
educational institution to perform contract by issuing diploma).
22 Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 898 (1975).
23 The doctrine of in loco parentis provides that educational institutions stand in the
shoes of parents when in custody of minor children, rendering rules and regulations generally not subject to challenge. See Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206
(1913).
24 See, e.g., Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997 (D.N.H. 1976); Buttny v. Smiley,
281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968).
15See Ray, supra note 17, at 183-84. Clearly, most academic cases are not more complex than many typical patent and antitrust cases.
26 See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79 (1978) (medical student
dismissed for failure to attain academic standard); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 845
(10th Cir. 1975) (nursing student dismissed for deficiencies in clinical courses); Aubuchon v.
Olson, 467 F. Supp. 568, 570-71 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (student teacher dismissed for failure to
fulfill responsibilities of education department).
The seminal decision to posit the doctrine of academic abstention in cases of academic
dismissal is Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913). In
Barnard,a private school dismissed a student for failing three subjects. Id. at 19, 102 N.E.
at 1096. In upholding the dismissal, the court held that the conduct of the school was not
subject to review "[s]o long as the school committee act[ed] in good faith." Id. More importantly, the court established a clear demarcation regarding reviewability of academic, as
opposed to disciplinary, dismissals:
When the real ground of exclusion is not misconduct there is no obligation on the
part of the school committee to grant a hearing .... Misconduct is a very different matter from failure to attain a standard of excellence in studies. ... A public
hearing may be regarded as helpful to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to scholarship.
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also been used in employment and discipline cases." Even when a
case is decided on other grounds, recitation by the court of academic abstention language seems almost obligatory.2 s The notion
that courts should stay out of cases that involve academic defendants in effect creates a presumption against section 1983 plaintiffs
and may tip the scales in an otherwise evenly divided case.29 Moreover, the indefinite nature of academic abstention makes it a favorite judicial tool that is difficult to counter.
Academic freedom is far more complicated than academic abstention as a defense in a section 1983 action. There exists a line of
cases that clearly establishes an individual's right to academic freedom. 30 This individual right has commonly been posed as a defense
against the civil rights claims of plaintiffs. For example, a student
may contend that expulsion from school, or failure in a class, has
violated his section 1983 rights. The school official might then defend with the claim that the expulsion or failing grade is protected
under the aegis of academic freedom. In considering this issue,
most courts have relied upon Justice Frankfurter's list of four coordinate rights in academic freedom: what will be taught, how it
will be taught, who will teach, and who will be taught. 31 Each of
these four rights has been used as the basis of decision,3 2 although
Id. at 22, 102 N.E. at 1097.
27 Cf. Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.) (student-university relationship does not exactly parallel commercial relationship), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
898 (1975); Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 491, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 440 (4th
Dep't 1928) (university has broad discretion to determine if student is detriment to academic or moral atmosphere).
26 See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978). Although the
Horowitz Court held that adequate notice had been given prior to dismissal, id. at 85, the
opinion nevertheless discussed the "distinct differences" between disciplinary decisions and
other academic actions, id. at 87.
2 Compare Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 486 F. Supp. 663, 667-68 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (university failed to meet its burden of proving that professor would have been rehired absent controversial actions), rev'd, 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S.
1106 (1982) with Hillis, 665 F.2d at 551 (court of appeals found that the district court was
"clearly erroneous" in factual findings since clear preponderance of evidence shows that professor would not have been renewed in any event), rev'g 486 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
30 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923). In perhaps the most important statement of an individual's right to academic freedom, the Supreme Court held that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
11 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
22 See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 664 F.2d 547, 552-53 (5th Cir.),
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33
the cases seldom specify academic freedom as the decisive issue.
Justice Frankfurter's list, however, is less useful to the individual
defendant than it is to the institutional defendant. Only rights pertaining to the method of teaching and the material to be taught are
plainly relevant to the individual, while all four are useful to universities as institutions.
Individual academic freedom is a curious defense in section
1983 jurisprudence. The doctrine of academic freedom has developed in a different context; namely, when the individual faculty
member has been a plaintiff asserting a violation of academic freedom rights by the university. As developed by the Supreme Court,
individual academic freedom protects professors and officials from
retaliation for off-the-job activities. 4 Individual academic freedom
also has been invoked as an affirmative defense in a Title VII 5 sex
discrimination case.3 6
Academic freedom, or academic discretion, as it is often called,
is most powerful as a defense when used by universities rather
than by individuals. In Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State University, 37 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided in
favor of the university on three of Justice Frankfurter's academic
freedom rights.3 In Hillis, a dismissed, untenured. professor al-

cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see also Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355
(M.D. Ala. 1970) (dictum) (state has a vested interest "in protecting the impressionable
minds of its young people from any form of extreme propagandism in the classroom"); infra
note 40 and accompanying text.
'3 See, e.g., Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa. Super. 527, 536-37, 419 A.2d 583, 587 (1980)
(academic evaluation, if based on opinion, and if not an abuse of privilege, is not a basis for
a libel action).
3' See Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1095-99.
3" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982). For an overview of Title VII in the university setting,
see generally Note, Title VII On Campus: JudicialReview of University Employment Decisions, 82 COLUMa. L. REV. 1206, 1213-35 (1982).
'1 See Dinnan v. Board of Regents, 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1106 (1982). In Dinnan, the Fifth Circuit rejected the "academic freedom" privilege
claim of a university professor who refused to answer deposition questions concerning his
vote on whether to give a female professor tenured status. Id. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit
also has held that virtually identical standards will apply in § 1983 and Title VII cases, see
Jepsen v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379, 1380-81, 1384 (5th Cir. 1980), which suggests that Dinnan may have persuasive value in the context of § 1983. The Dinnancase has
prompted scholarly notice. See generally Comment, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusions on
University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic FreedomPrivilege,69 CAL. L. REv. 1538, 155556 (1981) (urging recognition of qualified academic privilege).
3 665 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
33 See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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leged that his dismissal violated his academic freedom. 9 Defending
against this claim, the university stressed its rights to decide who
40
will teach, how subjects will be taught, and what will be taught.
The court upheld all three academic freedom rights.4 '

The doctrines of academic abstention and academic freedom
can be overcome if a plaintiff shows that the challenged action was
arbitrary or capricious, or made in bad faith with malice. 42 This
requirement stems from the unconscionability standard of common-law contract cases, 43 and has survived as the standard that
plaintiffs must meet in modern-day section 1983 cases. 44 This extra
burden upon plaintiffs, however, seems to conflict with recent Supreme Court pronouncements on section 1983 outside the university context. 45 In addition, state-of-mind issues should be irrele39 See 665 F.2d at 552. The professor in Hillis was dismissed because he failed to follow
administrative procedures, id. at 551, refused to obey orders concerning class enrollment
and grading policies, id. at 550-51, and treated university staff abusively, id. at 551-52.
40 See id. at 550-53. In Hillis, dismissal of the professor related to the right of the
university to decide who may teach. Id. at 551-52. Because the dismissal was based partly on
Hillis' refusal to give a "B" grade to a student as ordered by a superior, the dismissal involved the right of the school to decide how classes would be taught. See id. at 552-53.
Finally, because the dismissal was based partially on the professor's refusal to take a student into his class as ordered by his superiors, the school was exercising its right to decide
who may be taught. See id. at 550-51. Although the university apparently did not use Justice Frankfurter's terms of "who will teach, how subjects will be taught, and who will be
taught," the actions for which the university sought protection fit within the meaning of
those terms.
41 See id. at 549, 552-53. The court held that the professor's claim of academic freedom
lacked merit, id. at 549, because he showed no evidence of any "censorship of the content or
method of his teaching" that violated his first amendment rights, id. at 553.
"I See, e.g., LaTemple v. Wamsley, 549 F.2d 185, 188 (10th Cir. 1977) (employment
decisions by academic authorities are not reviewable on merits in absence of fraud or bad
faith); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (dismissed student must show
arbitrary or bad faith conduct on part of university); Lehmann v. Board of Trustees, 89
Wash. 2d 874, 879, 576 P.2d 397, 400 (1978) (decision of board of trustees upheld because it
was not done arbitrarily or capriciously). The burden of proving bad faith does not exist in §
1983 actions against non-academic defendants. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41
(1980) (plaintiff is not required to allege that defendant public official acted in bad faith to
sustain his claim, but burden is on defendant to plead good faith as an affirmative defense).
43 See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 898 (1975); Nordin, The Contract to Educate: Toward a More Workable Theory of
the Student-University Relationship, 8 J.C. & U.L. 141, 142 (1981).
44 See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975). In Gaspar, a dismissed
student challenged her academic dismissal by asserting a § 1983 claim that alleged denial of
her property right in continued education. Id. at 846. Affirming the exercise of academic
discretion by the university, the court held that although the student did indeed have a
property interest in a public education, the student is required to show that the action was
made arbitrarily or in bad faith. Id. at 850.
45 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980).
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vant to a section 1983 plaintiff's prima facie case. 46
A third special defense of educational entities is "educational
purpose," which stems primarily from Moore v. Student Affairs
Committee.47 Although the defense had existed previously, Moore
gave it substance. In denying a suspended student's request for reinstatement, the Moore court held that university disciplinary
rules should be presumed constitutional if they are related to a
clear interest of the university. 48 That interest came to be called
educational purpose.4 9
Educational purpose has been expanded greatly in subsequent
section 1983 cases and has proved valuable in upholding university
regulations related to education. For instance, several courts have
held that compulsory student fees do not violate student rights
against compelled expression, finding that the interest of a school
in broadening the educational experience is a valid educational
purpose.5 0 The overexpansion of the educational purpose doctrine
is best exemplified in the dormitory cases. In Bynes v. Toll,5 ' for
example, the Second Circuit upheld a rule prohibiting children
from living in married-student dormitories at the State University
of New York at Stony Brook, deferring to the university's assertion
40 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
47 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968).
48 See id. at 731. The student in Moore was indefinitely suspended after a warrantless

search of his dormitory room by school officials revealed a quantity of marijuana. Id. at 727.
The district court denied the student's request for reinstatement, id. at 731, noting that the
search was a "reasonable exercise of the college's supervisory duty," id. at 729. The court
found the university to have an "affirmative obligation to promulgate and to enforce reasonable regulations designed to protect campus order and discipline and to promote an environment consistent with the educational process" that outweighed the student's constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. The court then reasoned that
because the action by university officials was essential to obtaining the purposes of discipline and educational atmosphere, such activity or regulation was to be "presumed facially
reasonable despite the fact that it may infringe to some extent on the outer bounds of the
fourth amendment rights of student." Id.
49 Id. at 728-30.
50 See Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (D. Neb.), aff'd mem., 478 F.2d
1407 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974); Larson v. Board of Regents, 189
Neb. 688, 691, 204 N.W.2d 568, 570 (1973). Both Veed and Larson involved challenges to
the imposition by the University of Nebraska of mandatory fees on students to support a
newspaper, a speaker's program, and a student association. See Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 150;
Larson, 189 Neb. at 698, 204 N.W.2d at 570. In each case, the court held that because the
fees were not used to support only one political view, they did not violate the students'
constitutional rights. Veed, 353 F. Supp. at 152-53; Larson, 189 Neb. at 690, 204 N.W.2d at
570.
"1 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975).
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of maintaining safety and quiet study as educational purposes. 12
For similar reasons of educational purpose, the Eighth and Third
Circuits, respectively, have upheld school rules requiring adult students to live in university housing5 3 and forbidding door-to-door
salespeople from university housing. 54 It is suggested that these divergent results-that in New York, children may be precluded
from dormitories, while in South Dakota, adults must live
there-illustrate the ad hoc nature of the educational purpose
doctrine.
Although the judicial tendency to grant great deference to universities has its roots in the three doctrines discussed thus far, it is
often expressed in flowery language that suggests more than mere
deference to university defendants. Justice Powell has provided
the best recent example of judicial identification with academia.
Dissenting in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,55 in
which the Court entertained a challenge to the women-only admissions policy of a nursing school, Justice Powell rhapsodized about
the beneficial effects of single-sex higher education.5 6 His discussion of the Ivy League men's schools and the Seven Sisters
women's colleges was nostalgic and poetic.
The tendency of highly educated judges to identify with
academia and to project back to their own youth and education is
perhaps natural. It has been argued, however, that this tendency
has produced illogical reasoning and inconsistent results. 57 In Hogan, for example, Justice Powell would have upheld the admissions
policy even though it represented state-imposed sex discrimina52 Id. at 256-57. It is submitted that the Bynes court might just as easily have taken

judicial notice that university housing in the 1970's was seldom quiet, and rarely used as a
place for quiet study, thereby determining that children would not be a disruption to dormitory life.
" See Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 778-79 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975). The court chronicled a list of twenty-seven advantages and eighteen disadvantages to required on-campus housing, id. at 778 n.4, and, virtually declaring
that "academia knows best," concluded that rational educational purposes were promoted
by the regulation, even though the primary purpose of the regulation was to insure enough
boarders to pay the revenue bonds for dormitory construction, id. at 778-79. The court further held that the regulation did not violate the students' right of privacy, as the classification was neither made on a "suspect" basis, id. at 781, nor violative of any "fundamental
rights," id. at 781-82.
11 See American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 618 F.2d 252, 257 (3d Cir.
1980).
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
Id. at 737, 744 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5' See Ray, supra note 17, at 179.
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tion.58 The romanticizing of university life, moreover, is inaccurate,
since the "ivory tower" has been replaced by a large, imposing bureaucracy, differing from other bureaucracies only by its specific
purpose.5 9
The net effect of favoring universities over other section 1983
defendants is difficult to estimate, but undoubtedly it has led to
plaintiffs' rights occasionally going unvindicated.6 0 It has resulted
in confusion and slipshod analysis in cases in which traditional section 1983 analysis conflicts with educational analysis.6 ' That the
application of special rules to academic parties favors those parties
is only part of the problem, however. Sui generis treatment results
in sui generis decisionmaking. The judicial treatment of universities under section 1983 apparently derives from notions about the
historical development of universities. Colleges and universities
were originally independent communities outside the laws of the
land.62 As such, they were sovereign in their realm and, like the
king, could do no wrong. 3 Today there are no kings, universities
are usually affiliated with government rather than separated from
government, and hosts of federal and state civil rights laws are applicable to universities. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the courts, universities almost always do no wrong.
" See
1- D.

458 U.S. at 736, 744 (Powell, J., dissenting).

BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER

61-66 (1982).

60See, e.g., Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1978). In Starsky, the court ordered a discharged professor
reinstated. Id. at 928. The university asserted that it had the right to discharge for unpopular behavior; the court held that the school did in fact have such a right. See id. at 916. In
the case, however, the charges of the university were found to be unsubstantiated. See id. It
is necessary to cite Starsky, a case in which the plaintiff both won and lost, since the special
status rules for universities apparently often operate to prevent § 1983 cases from being
filed.
'" See, e.g., Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 845, 851 (10th Cir. 1975). See generally H.
EDWARDS, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE UNHOLY CRUSADE AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL REGULA-

25-41 (1980). In Gaspar,the Tenth Circuit held that due process was not violated even
when student dismissals were expressly left to the sole discretion of the faculty. Gaspar,513
F.2d at 845, 851.
02 See H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 13, at 3, 25.
TION

63 See Delgado, College Searches and Seizures: Students, Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59-66 (1974) (discussing traditional paternalistic notions
used in past to limit students' rights); Henderson & Isenberg, The Law and Academic Evaluation and Dismissal in HigherEducation, 13 Cum. L. REv. 475, 476-78 (1983) (historically
courts have exhibited a "policy of nonintervention" with respect to university dismissals).
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TYPES OF ACTIONS AGAINST UNIVERSITIES

Anything that can be redressed under section 1983 is conceiva-

bly the subject of an action against a university defendant. Just as
universities have fallen into special defense categories, they have
found themselves defendants most often in three types of actions.
Universities are probably sued most often for alleged violations of
employees' constitutional or statutory rights in promotion, tenure,
and continued employment, with race discrimination frequently
being charged.6 4 Recently, the use of section 1983 has been supplemented, and sometimes supplanted, by sex discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Following the
reasoning in Board of Regents v. Roth,"' plaintiffs in section 1983
employment cases typically assert the loss of a property interest in
their jobs6 7 and a curtailment of a future liberty interest.68 Many

claims further assert that the university decisionmaking procedure
was deficient as a matter of due process. 9
"Disciplinary" cases form a second type of section 1983 case in
which universities are commonly defendants. Such cases include
those in which dormitory rooms are searched, 70 or students are forbidden to engage in specified activities, 1 or outsiders challenge
university regulations.7 2 Dormitory residence, demonstration, literSee, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559
(1956).
65 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982); see Note, Academic Freedom, Secrecy and Subjectivity
as Obstacles to Proving a Title VII Sex Discrimination Suit in Academia, 60 N.C.L. REV.
438, 444 (1982).
66408 U.S. 564 (1972); see infra note 75.
67 See, e.g., Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 154 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
68 See, e.g., Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1976) (rehearing en
banc).

6" See, e.g., Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243, 246 (9th Cir. 1976); Ross v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
70 See, e.g., Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 998 (D.N.H. 1976); Piazzola v. Watkins,

316 F. Supp. 624, 628 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Moore v. Student
Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730 (M.D. Ala. 1968). See generally Delgado, supra note
63, at 68-74 (discussing cases involving dormitory room searches); Note, Mandatory Housing Requirements: The Constitutionality of ParietalRules, 60 IOWA L. REV. 992, 1004 &
n.70 (1975) (discussing nature of student privacy in dormitory context).
71 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972). Healy is considered the leading case
dealing with an attempt by a university to forbid students from certain activities. A recent
similar case is Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 269, 276 (1981). Both cases were decided on first
amendment grounds.
712See, e.g., American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 618 F.2d 252, 253 (3d
Cir. 1980); Brush v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 489 Pa. 243, 246, 414 A.2d 48, 53 (1980).
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ature distribution, rioting, and sports eligibility cases share similar
reasoning." Rather than being disciplinary cases, however, they
appear to be "conduct" cases, since the university is attempting to
regulate conduct.
The final major classification of university cases includes those
that involve challenges to clearly academic decisions: grading, academic dismissals, teaching assignments, and scholarship

standards.
Universities, of course, may become defendants in section 1983
suits that stem from other actions, but are so seldom sued outside
these three areas that extensive discussion is unwarranted. The academic cases normally feature property interest claims by plaintiffs, while conduct cases assert liberty interests. Procedural irregularity is asserted in nearly every section 1983 case with an
academic defendant. These three categories have no clear-cut
boundaries, and as a consequence plaintiffs may assert violations
of academic, employment, and procedural rights.75 The majority of
university section 1983 cases, however, fall conveniently into one of
the three types of actions described. It is critical to examine them
individually to see how each is affected by the "educational immunity" doctrines discussed in Section I.
7' See, e.g., Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 779-82 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 952 (1975) (court rejected contention that university regulation requiring
all single freshmen and sophomores to live in residence halls denied students equal protection); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087-90 (8th Cir. 1969)
(college students who engaged in mass gatherings and acts of violence not entitled to constitutional protection), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Reid v. Barrett, 467 F. Supp. 124,
127-28 (D.N.J. 1979) (school board denial of teacher's request to use students to distribute
letters not violative of teacher's first amendment rights), aff'd mem., 615 F.2d 1354 (3d Cir.
1980).
7' See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79 (1978) (dismissal of medical
student); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 845 (10th Cir. 1975) (dismissal of nursing student); Aubuchon v. Olsen, 467 F. Supp. 568, 570-71 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (dismissal of studentteacher).
7" See Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152-54 (M.D. Pa. 1978). In
Ross, a dismissed graduate student on fellowship asserted an academic property interest in
continuing as a student, id. at 152, an employment property interest in the fellowship, id. at
154, and a liberty interest in both, id. The student also asserted procedural irregularity
throughout the dismissal. Id. at 152-54; accord Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569
(1972) (dismissed teacher alleged that failure of university to give notice of reasons for termination and a hearing thereon violated procedural due process); Stevens v. Hunt, 646 F.2d
1168, 1169 (6th Cir. 1981) (former medical students alleged that academic dismissal constituted violation of due process).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:228

A. Employment Decisions
The bulk of cases concerning section 1983 challenges to employment decisions are relatively recent, following the decision in
Board of Regents v. Roth7" and subsequent Supreme Court cases.
The gravamen of a typical employment case is the allegation by an
employee that the university has deprived the employee of an employment opportunity to which the employee assumed entitlement.
Most common are cases in which a professor has been dismissed,
or denied tenure, which is tantamount to dismissal.7 7 The employee can be expected to maintain that the objective qualifications for retention of employment or granting of tenure have been
met, and that the failure of the institution to recognize that fact
amounts to a denial of a property right in employment. 78 In addition, the plaintiff will usually assail the procedures by which the
university reached its employment decision."
It is clear that the employment specifications and procedures
of a university do create entitlements to property and expectations
of procedural regularity.8 0 Nearly all universities publish detailed
7 408 U.S. 564 (1972). The Roth court held that a dismissed teacher was not entitled to
a hearing prior to termination since it could not be shown that the termination deprived
him of a liberty or property interest in continued employment. Id. at 575-78. Courts in
subsequent cases have relied on Roth in reviewing employment discrimination. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976); Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 639, 641-42 (4th
Cir. 1979). In Bishop, the Court held that the state had not deprived a police officer of any
liberty or property interest in dismissing him. 426 U.S. at 347-48. Similarly, in Clark, the
court, relying on Roth and Bishop, held that a faculty member has neither a property nor a
liberty right to a promotion. 607 F.2d at 639, 641-42. See generally Henderson & Isenberg,
supra note 63, at 478-80 (discussing liberty and property rights involved in academic dismissals and evaluations).
7 For a survey of the academic employment cases, see Matheson, Judicial Enforcement of Academic Tenure: An Examination, 50 WASH. L. REV. 597 (1975).
78 Announced standards for obtaining and retaining tenure at American universities are
remarkably similar. See H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 13, at 218-27. The announced
standards of one university were directly challenged in Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634 (4th
Cir. 1979), where the court noted that "[a] teacher's competence and qualifications ... are
by their very nature matters calling for highly subjective determinations," id. at 639.
71 The claim that procedural due process was denied in reaching an employment decision stems from the decisions in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) and
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 595 (1972). To discharge an employee with an entitlement in employment, the university must show that it has provided a constitutionally adequate procedure for denying the employment interest. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 551-52 (1983).
80 See Soni v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 289, 292 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), af'd, 513
F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976). A university may create employment entitlements that go beyond its own specifications and procedures. Id. (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 564, 602 (1972)). Legal entitlement in employment through agree-
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criteria for promotion and tenure, accompanied by equally detailed
institutional procedures specifying the method for making employment decisions. This appears to favor section 1983 plaintiffs, for
failure by a governmental entity to follow its own criteria or procedures can be fatal when defending a section 1983 suit. s ' The
courts, however, have made it clear that defendant universities will
not be held to their promises. Mere allegations of adherence to
university performance criteria and procedures will normally be ac8 2
cepted in court.
Universities are in some ways treated like administrative agencies. They have what amounts to primary jurisdiction over all matters, and the burden is on a challenging plaintiff to show that any
decision was not within their discretion. 3 Even in cases in which
the plaintiff has shown the likelihood that "impermissible" factors
weighed in the decision, the plaintiff has had difficulty recovering
against a university.8 4 In Mt. Healthy City School District v.
Doyle, 5 for example, the Supreme Court held that if a public
school teacher would have been fired regardless of extracurricular
first amendment activities, the firing of that teacher was not acment has long been recognized under state law. Brown, Tenure Rights in Contractualand
ConstitutionalContext, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 279, 290 (1977); see, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving
Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 415, 333 P.2d 757, 760 (1958).
81 See Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
82 See Note, supra note 65, at 438-39; e.g., Brogan v. Wiggins School Dist., 588 F.2d
409, 412 (10th Cir. 1978) (no § 1983 violation when state followed well-established
procedures).
81 The analogy between § 1983 analysis and administrative law analysis is developed
most fully in Shuck, Suing Our Servants: The Court, Congress, and the,Liability of Public
Officials for Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 281, 355. The requirement of a showing of bad
faith or arbitrariness is comparable to the standards under § 10(e)(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See Marburg v. Cole, 286 N.Y. 202, 211-12,
36 N.E.2d 113, 117 (1941).
84 See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 486 F. Supp. 663, 667-68, rev'd, 665
F.2d 547 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 639
(4th Cir. 1979). In Hillis, the plaintiff professor had convinced a trial court that he was
dismissed for exercising his first amendment rights. 486 F. Supp. at 668. The professor had
also produced evidence to indicate that personal dislike played a part in the dismissal decision. Id. at 665-66. Nevertheless, the appellate court held that the dismissal was above challenge, since the university had shown that there were alternative reasons for the plaintiff's
dismissal. 665 F.2d at 551-52. In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Hillis skimmed over evidence
indicating that the university had employed some very irregular procedures in its dealings
with the plaintiff. Id. at 549-51.
In Clark, the court refused to review a faculty promotion decision, notwithstanding the
alleged failure of the university to apply the same standards in judging the plaintiff's qualifications as had been used in the past. See 607 F.2d at 639.
85 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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tionable5 It is suggested that, when a university acts with mixed
motives, the court should determine which purpose, the permissible or the impermissible, resulted in the firing.
Clark v. Whiting17 represents one of the fullest expositions of
judicial deference to university defendants. In Clark, the plaintiff
was an associate professor who believed he deserved a promotion
to full professor.8 8 As with most schools, the university used a
three-factor assessment in making promotions, examining the employee's teaching, scholarly work, and service to the university
community.8 9 The evidence indicated that Clark, as compared to
other faculty members, did not adequately meet the expectations
of the university.9 0 It was clear that the university followed its
published procedures and even made additional hearings available
to Clark.9 1 Thus, an objective assessment of the evidence was
enough to justify dismissal of the case.92 The court continued, however, asserting that the federal courts were almost never a proper
forum for such disputes.9 3 The court's comment is plainly dictum,
"' See id. at 285-87; accord Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 551
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). The Mt. Healthy Court attempted to
find a standard that "protects against the invasion of constitutional rights without commanding undesirable consequences not necessary to the assurance of those rights." 429 U.S.
at 287.
8:7 607 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 1979).
88 Id. at 636-37. The plaintiff unsuccessfully alleged that the failure of the university to
apply the same standards in evaluating his scholarly contributions as were used in reviewing
promotion decisions of other faculty members violated equal protection of the law. Id. at
640. The plaintiff also contended, again unsuccessfully, that he was entitled to a complete
hearing, including the right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses heard by the school
board. Id. at 642.
:9 Id.
at 636-37.
80 Id. at 637-38.
9' Id. at 637. Although the university school board had voluntarily granted the plaintiff
hearings, it was alleged that these hearings did not meet the requirements of a trial-type
hearing. Id. at 637, 642. Reasoning that the plaintiff had neither a property nor a liberty
entitlement to any pretermination hearing, the court viewed the hearings that were granted
as an act of "courtesy" on the part of the school board. Id. at 642. Such an act of courtesy,
reasoned the court, does not "ripen[] automatically into an act of right generating all the
requirements of a trial-type due process hearing, as the plaintiff would assert." Id.
82

Id. at 644-45.

Id. at 639-41. In support of its holding, the Clark court relied on Bishop v. Wood, 426
U.S. 341 (1976), in which the Court refused to reinstate a discharged policeman, admonishing that the "instances in which the federal judiciary has required a state agency to reinstate a discharged employee for failure to provide a pretermination hearing are extremely
rare." Id. at 349 n.14. The Clark court also cited Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
86 n.3, 90 (1978), as implying that faculty members possess no due process rights to hearings
and procedures to appeal academic dismissals. 607 F.2d at 643.
83
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but it is dangerous dictum, implying that the agreed-upon standards and procedures that apply between university and professor
are meaningless. Such reasoning is contrary to the common understanding that governments, including universities, may by law or
regulation provide more rights or procedures than are required by
the Federal Constitution or statutes.9 4 Furthermore, the focus of
section 1983 actions is on the removal or alteration by the state of
interests in either liberty or property, whether created by the state
or by the federal government."
The one instance in which courts have scrutinized university
procedures to assure that they were followed is when universities
reduce the number of faculty members because either revenue fell
short or a legislative body cut the budget. These are called "retrenching" cases."6 To justify wholesale reductions in faculty force,
universities have been compelled to show that reductions were
made either on a strictly neutral basis97 or on the basis of compelling financial need.' The courts have not allowed hard times to be
used as a pretext for firing an unpopular professor.9 In contrast to
other section 1983 cases, retrenching cases are marked by a close
analysis of budget, staffing, and curriculum. Perhaps the distinction results from the emphasis on numerical, rather than academic,
evidence, but this does not explain the willingness of courts to look
into academic issues in such cases. A better explanation might be
that courts more readily see the potential for biased decisionmak'4 See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 303 (1982) (state-granted rights to patients in
mental institutions greater than required by federal Constitution).
91 See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 300 (1982) (state-created interests entitled to
due process protection); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976) (no remedy for deprivation of an interest not protected by state or federal laws).
91 See, e.g., Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 678-80 (4th Cir. 1978); Johnson
v. Board of Regents, 377 F. Supp. 227, 234-35 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 510 F.2d 975
(7th Cir. 1975); see also Benson, Tenure Rights in Higher Education in the Face of Financial Exigency: The Impact of Private Agreement, Collective Bargaining, The AAUP and
the Courts, 1983 Dar. C.L. REv. 678, 695; Bolger & Wilmoth, Dismissal of Tenured Faculty
Members for Reasons of Financial Exigency, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 347, 347-49 (1982); Note,
The Dismissal of Tenured Facultyfor Reasons of FinancialExigency, 51 IND. L.J. 417, 41719 (1976).
7 See Klein v. Board of Higher Educ., 434 F. Supp. 1113, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levitt
v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Neb. 1974).
98 See Scheuer v. Creighton Univ., 199 Neb. 618, 630, 260 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1977); see
also Browzin v. Catholic Univ., 527 F. 2d 843, 846-48 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (university required to
make every effort to find professor, fired because of financial exigency, another suitable
position).
" See Levitt v. Board of Trustees, 376 F. Supp. 945, 950 (D. Neb. 1974).
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ing in times of financial crisis, when university politics is at its
most political.' 0
In section 1983 employment cases outside the retrenching context, courts have shown a tendency to defer to university defendants. '1 1 The primary method of deferral has been the use of academic abstention, as shown in the Clark case discussed above."0 2
Notions of academic freedom, especially the "who will teach" and
"what will be taught" aspects also flavor most opinions involving
university employment. 0 3 It should be noted, however, that, although plaintiffs in section 1983 employment cases have had difficulties, suits brought under other civil rights provisions have
proved more successful. 0 4 The comparative clarity of the statutory
language and legislative intent in these statutes may explain this
greater success. Still, even in cases involving race or sex discrimination prohibited by statute, the courts have been more deferential
to academic defendants than to other defendants. 0 5
B.

Academic Actions

University defendants have always enjoyed almost blanket immunity from section 1983 actions challenging purely academic decisions. 0 6 The bulk of these decisions concerns grading and student dismissals, although occasionally a faculty member may
100 See Klein v. Board of Higher Educ., 434 F. Supp. 1113,
101 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74

1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
(1972). In Roth, the Court
left decision whether to rehire a non-tenured teacher for another year to the unfettered
discretion of University officials. See id. at 578; accord Mittelstaedt v. Board of Trustees,
487 F. Supp. 960, 965 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (mandatory retirement age for teachers); Carr v.
Board of Trustees, 465 F. Supp. 886, 896-97 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (dismissal of professor on
basis of his publication record), aff'd mem., 663 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1981); infra notes 102104 and accompanying text.
10 See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
oI See, e.g., Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
972 (1973); Mittelstadt v. Board of Trustees, 487 F. Supp. 960, 965 (E.D. Ark. 1980);
Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees, 315 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (D. Mich. 1970); see also supra
notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
104 See generally W. KAPLIN, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 108-28 (1980).
105 See H. EDWARDS, supra note 61, at 27-31, 39-42.
100 See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 72 (4th Cir. 1983);
Gamble v. University of Minn., 639 F.2d 452, 453 (8th Cir. 1981); Miller v. Hamline Univ.
School of Law, 601 F.2d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Charlotte's Web:
Reflections on the Role of Due Process in Academic Decisionmaking, 56 IND. L.J. 725, 72732 (1981) (discussion and criticism of "academic abstention" and role of courts in academic
dismissals); Note, Academic Dismissals: A Due Process Anomaly, Board of Curators v.
Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), 58 NEB. L. REV. 519, 529-31 (1979) (analysis of role of courts in
academic dismissals).
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contest a teaching assignment. 10 7 The most prominent case in the
academic area is Board of Curatorsv. Horowitz,08o in which a medical student who performed well in the classroom setting was dismissed, based upon poor clinical performance, when graduation
was imminent. 0 9 The Horowitz Court held that the student's procedural due process rights had not been violated because she had
been "fully informed . . . of the faculty's dissatisfaction."" 0 The
Court assumed that the student had a valid liberty interest in continued education,"" but held that the school provided process beyond the requirements of the Constitution." 2 Relying on state and
lower federal court decisions, the Court averred that students possess no clear procedural due process rights in academic

dismissals.""
The unspoken but implicit force behind Horowitz and a host
of similar cases is the doctrine of academic freedom." 4 "Who will
be taught" presupposes the power of universities to set minimum
standards for admissions and continued enrollment. "What will be
taught" presupposes that the university, and its faculty, have the
authority to determine whether a student has learned what has
been taught.
Universities usually issue rules and regulations pertaining to
academic performance, and provide procedures for students to appeal academic decisions. Unquestionably, the university makes the
ultimate academic decision, but a student will nevertheless have a
107 See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 549-50 (5th Cir.)
(right of professor to teach and grade courses), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); Aubuchon
v. Olson, 467 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. Mo. 1979) (academic dismissal of student).
2o8435 U.S. 78 (1977).
109 Id. at 79.
110 Id. at 85.

, Id. at 84-85.
Id. at 85. In Horowitz, the respondent's performance, just as the performance of
other students at the school, was evaluated periodically by a council composed of both
faculty and students. Id. at 80. The council recommended, subject to the dean's approval,
that the respondent advance to her final year of school "on a probationary basis." Id. at 81.
Subsequent evaluations by the council led to a further recommendation that the respondent
be dismissed unless her performance improved radically. Id. Appealing the decision, the
respondent worked with several physicians whose cumulative evaluation indicated that her
performance had not improved. Id. Meeting again, the council suggested that the school
dismiss the respondent, and thereafter the dean informed her of his approval of the council's recommendation. Id. at 81-82.
'13Id. at 87-91.
14 Justice Powell is considered to have initiated the concept of institutional academic
freedom with his comments on the subject in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312 (1978).
1
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cause of action under section 1983 should the university fail to follow its own standards or procedures. Written standards and procedures are precisely the types of guarantees that create interests
protectable under section 1983.115 The statement in Horowitz that

students possess no due process rights in academic decisionmaking
is unfortunate, and seems to have influenced other cases. 11 6 It is

suggested that courts should be more sensitive to rights created by
state and local entities.
Academic freedom defenses have been applied comparably in
academic libel suits.

17

The academic privilege applies in these

cases if the opinion is based on academic principles. Personal in
will and arbitrary conclusions, however, are not protected."'
Challenges to academic actions present one of the greatest potentials for complicating section 1983 jurisprudence. Ill will or arbitrariness is the only standard for relief in purely academic cases.
The existence of rights violations cannot be presumed absent, as
Horowitz appears to permit. It is conceivable that an academic decision-for example, a failing grade-could be used as a cover for
sexual harassment of a student by a professor. Yet sexual harassment cannot be excused under section 1983 merely because an academic reason is proffered in explanation. Nevertheless, Horowitz
seems to condone such a result, which is a compelling reason for
limiting that case to its facts. Ill will, bad faith, or arbitrariness is
an uncertain standard, since such a standard requires the use of
115 See United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 564 (5th Cir. 1982);
Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1980); Ross v. Pennsylvania
State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152-53 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
n"- See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. of Va., 719 F.2d 69, 72-74 (4th Cir. 1983)
(dismissal of law student not violative of due process); Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State
Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 549-50 (5th Cir.) (dismissal of professor), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982); Gamble v. University of Minn., 639 F.2d 452, 453 (8th Cir. 1981) (dismissal of medical student).
117 See, e.g., Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 649 (3d Cir.) (former law school dean defamed), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980); Scarpelli v. Jones, 229 Kan. 210, 213, 626 P.2d
785, 789 (1981) (professor called racist by students); Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa. Super. 527,
531, 419 A.2d 583, 587-88 (1980) (student allegedly defamed by professor).
18 See Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 648 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980);
Beckman v. Dunn, 276 Pa. Super. 527, 537, 419 A.2d 583, 587 (1980). The standard in academic libel cases is much like the qualified privilege given media defendants in libel suits.
See Barron, The Rise and Fall of a Doctrine of Editorial Privilege:Reflections on Herbert
v. Lando, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1002, 1004-05 (1980). A similar standard is employed in
cases involving "academic abstention." See supra note 42 and accompanying text. It is also
remarkably similar to the test required to overcome a qualified immunity test in non-academic § 1983 cases. See infra notes 316-332 and accompanying text.
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controversial "state of mind" evidence. 119
As Justice Marshall noted in a separate opinion in Horowitz,
there are few university actions that are purely academic. 120 Elements of conduct and impermissible motivation will appear frequently in section 1983 cases with academic defendants. The mere
assertion that an action is academic should not constitute a complete defense. To fulfill its role as watchdog of citizens' rights, the
judiciary should actively scrutinize asserted justifications in section
1983 actions, especially in academic cases, in which bad faith decisionmaking may be easily concealed. 2 ' The courts should not second guess academic decisions, but neither should they grant
academia a presumption enjoyed by no other defendants.
Academic decisions necessarily are highly discretionary. In
that sense, they are not substantially different from many other
decisions made by state and local government officials. A section
1983 plaintiff has a difficult case when challenging a routine decision of a city or county planning agency, but that case becomes
much easier when evidence shows that the plaintiff was harmed by
22
the impermissible purpose of the agency in making the decision.1
In most non-property cases, the nature of the right denied sets the
level of inquiry a court will undertake. Such a variable approach
has worked in other institutional contexts,' 2 and should likewise
be applied to section 1983 cases with academic defendants.
C.

Conduct Decisions

The clearest judicial reasoning in university cases under section 1983 is found in those disputes that involve conduct. The reasons for this are clear. First, disciplinary actions are the types of
issues with which courts frequently deal. Judges are in their partic119See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-17 (1982); see also Nahmod, Constitutional Accountability in Section 1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1982) (arguing
that state of mind is relevant to specific violations).
120 Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 97 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring and
dissenting).
12 The informal nature of university decisionmaking requires that surface assertions be
closely scrutinized. In one case, the proffered academic reason for a teacher's discharge was
found to bear no relationship to academic objectives. See Hander v. San Jacinto Junior
College, 519 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1975).
122 See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1980) (nuisance
statute must adhere to narrowly drawn procedures); Fountain v. Metropolitan Atl. Rapid
Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043-45 (11th Cir. 1982) (property taken by eminent domain
must be used for public purpose).
'23 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 79, at 551-52.
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ular area of expertise when reviewing "punishments" of students
for what amounts to "convictions" for violating university "laws"
and regulations. Second, conduct issues are seldom also academic
issues, which tend to be asserted only secondarily in conduct challenges under section 1983. When academic assertions by university
defendants are considered, it is normally under the rubric of educational purpose rather than academic freedom or academic abstention. 12 4 Third, conduct cases often raise claims of peculiarly
egregious denials of rights-for example, denials of first amendment rights, subjections to unreasonable searches and seizures, and
denials of due process. 12 5 When these rights are abridged, judges
are alert to assure that students' rights do not stop at the "school26
house gate.'
Conduct cases may arise under section 1983 whenever a university seeks to prohibit or regulate certain behavior. The distinction between prohibition and regulation has proved decisive. 27
Universities have recognized that there are due process responsibilities in traditional disciplinary actions for violations of university prohibitions. 128 Most universities have adopted clear, written
standards defining prohibited activities, along with detailed procedures for adjudicating violations of such standards. 12 These universities recognize the discretion granted them by the courts in academic actions, but few have specific standards concerning
academic discipline. 130
124 Cf. Note, Search and the Single Dormitory Room, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1540, 1550-54
(1979) (dormitory searches must meet educational purpose test).
"' See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 177 (1972) (first amendment); Morale v.
Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 991 (D.N.H. 1976); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777, 781 (W.D.
Mich. 1975) (search and seizure under fourth amendment).
128 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
127 See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969)

(blanket prohibition of free speech rights is impermissible, but school may regulate by less
restrictive means to maintain order), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); W. MILLINGTON, THE
LAW AND THE COLLEGE STUDENT 258-59 (1929) (distinguishing prior restraint of speech from
post-publication punishment through regulation).
128 See Golden, ProceduralDue Process for Students at Public Colleges and Universities, 11 J.L. & EDuc. 337, 344 (1982). After the landmark case of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565
(1975), in which the Supreme Court held that a student's right to a public education is a
property interest that cannot be taken away for misconduct without adherence to due process, id. at 574, public colleges and universities have provided predismissal hearings when
dismissal was based on disciplinary reasons, Golden, supra, at 344. Of the 58 schools surveyed by Golden, each had some form of hearing for disciplinary dismissals, and most had
some form of dismissal procedure for academic deficiency cases. Id. at 344-45.
12' See Golden, supra note 128, at 338, 340-45.
110 See id. at 358-59.
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Few courts, however, have recognized that time, place, and
manner regulations are also conduct decisions. 131 In Spartacus
3 2 the court balanced the inYouth League v. Board of Trustees,"
terest of the university in maintaining the peace necessary to its
educational mission against the interest of those who sought to use
university facilities to sell literature without complying with the
regulation requiring advance written permission. 1' 3 The court refused to accept the asserted educational purpose of preventing disruption of the academic atmosphere of the student center, finding
that the student center was used by thousands of students daily,
often for exactly the type of activity in which the group sought to
engage. 34 The court further held that the regulations were overbroad and vague, and advised the school to set standards in future
regulations and to provide a procedural review mechanism. 3 5 The
Spartacus court required the university to meet standards like
those in traditional disciplinary cases, having separated the university action into conduct and academic issues and deciding that the
conduct issue was more important.
Few courts have taken the Spartacus approach. In the dormitory cases discussed earlier, the courts failed to consider the conduct issues raised by the students. Rather, the courts accepted assertions of educational purpose as sufficient to uphold rules
requiring and denying dormitory residence. 3 6 Considered as conduct regulation rather than academic regulation, these decisions
would be difficult to sustain. The schools were allowed to engage in
conduct regulation without any inquiry by the courts into the relationship between the regulation and the schools' educational purpose. Bona fide academic justifications should be required in such
137
cases.
University conduct regulation has been influenced by the de'31 But see Shamloo v. Mississippi State Bd. of Trustees, 620 F.2d 516, 521 (5th Cir.
1980) (recognizing that time, place, and manner restrictions are conduct decisions and,
therefore, must be consistent with constitutional safeguards).
132 502 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. IMI.1980).
133 See id. at 799-80.
I" See id. at 800-01. The Spartacus court stated that since the university permitted
the distribution of printed matter by certain individuals, it could not limit this privilege to a
select few. Id.
135 Id. at 802.

See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
37 See Mollere v. Southeastern La. College, 304 F. Supp. 826, 827 (E.D. La. 1969) (failure of college to show academic reasons for regulations requiring unmarried women to live
in dormitories violated equal protection).
"I
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cline of the doctrine of in loco parentis over the past twenty years.
The result has been a limitation confined to traditional disciplinary matters.1 3 If a university charges a student with possession of
marijuana, for example, a full panoply of rights may be asserted
under section 1983.19 If a university attempts to control a student's life style or activities, however, the student's rights are less
certain. Cases such as Spartacus and Widmar v. Vincent 40 offer
an approach to plaintiffs in these non-disciplinary conduct cases.
In Spartacus and Widmar, students and outsiders successfully argued that a university, since it is uniquely the marketplace of
ideas, was a place in which they were entitled to exercise their first
amendment rights of academic freedom."4 Although these cases
add vaporous ideas to the already amorphous reasoning in academic freedom cases, they bring renewed vigor to the notion that
the university is a laboratory of ideas.
In conduct cases, the courts have shown a sensitivity to rights
that is missing in employment and academic cases. Pure disciplinary actions have drawn judges into taking a hard look at the justifications offered by a university, often leading to rejection of those
justifications as pretext. In non-disciplinary cases, however, the
courts seem confused over whether to apply the various doctrines
that have historically protected universities. The standards should
be the same for both types of conduct cases; academic defendants
should be required to demonstrate academic justifications for conduct actions. The courts should assure that the justifications are
tied to the educational mission of the university, and that regula"' See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968). The death of in loco
parentis does not mean that a university may not enact regulations to prevent disruptive
conduct or to engage in disciplinary action when such conduct occurs. See id. However, a
public institution may not enact disciplinary measures for the sake of discipline. Breen v.
Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 1969) (regulation forbidding male students from growing
their hair long is invalid absent evidence that long hair promotes disruptive behavior), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
239 See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 991 (D.N.H. 1976). In Morale, a student
at a
state technical school brought a § 1983 action against the school authorities for basing his
suspension on the alleged illegal seizure of marijuana from his dormitory room, id., since a
university official may be held liable for damages under § 1983 if he either knew or reasonably should have known that his actions constituted a violation of a student's constitutional
rights, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). Nevertheless, outside of search and
seizure and first amendment violations, students rarely succeed in § 1983 actions.
"-o 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
141 See id. at 277 (university cannot enforce a content-based exclusion
of students' religious speech); Spartacus,502 F. Supp. at 801 (university regulation prohibiting sale of political literature by non-students unconstitutionally infringed upon first amendment rights).
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tions based on those justifications are clearly related to achievement of the institutional mission. This is required of other section
1983 defendants,"4 2 and should not be too much to expect from
institutions that so pervasively affect their students and
employees. 41 3
D. Mixed Actions
Almost all section 1983 actions brought against university defendants will offer a combination of issues. Invariably, the university can be expected to raise academic issues as a defense. The
courts must be careful to assess and divide the issues in mixedissue cases. In Board of Curators v. Horowitz,4 for example, the
evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff lacked the temperament
to be a good doctor. 45 Such a decision was at least partly based on
the student's conduct, for her performance in clinical classes was
the reason for dismissal.4 " The Court, however, did not recognize
the dismissal as a conduct dismissal'14 7 A professional school
should perhaps be permitted to exercise a greater degree of discretion, since professional schools normally produce graduates who
will work in service careers such as law, medicine, and social work.
A student who proves utterly unable to provide the service demanded by the profession may be a fine academic student, as
Horowitz was, but at the same time a poor professional school student. The Court failed to make this distinction between the type of
decision a medical school must make and the type that a community junior college must make. It is understandable that the level
of discretion will enlarge as students enter graduate and professional programs, for such programs are often heavily clinical or decidedly esoteric. In such programs, the judgment of faculty mem142See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Casenote, Defining the Parameters of Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1219, 1236-38 (1982).
1' The academic community includes millions of students and thousands of faculty
members; moreover, universities are tied directly or indirectly to virtually all other portions
of society. D. BoK, supra note 59, at 61-66.
144 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
141 Id.
at 80-82; see supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
145 Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85. The Horowitz Court accepted the finding that Ms.
Horowitz had been discharged for poor performance in her clinical studies. Id.
14 Id. at 89-90. In Horowitz, the Court distinguished the plaintiff's discharge for academic reasons from disciplinary action based on improper conduct. See id. Whereas disciplinary actions involve investigative techniques and subjective evaluations of student conduct,
academic dismissals involve expert evaluation of educational competence not readily adaptable to the judicial process. Id.
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hers is necessarily relied upon.
Ironically, six years prior to the Horowitz decision, the Supreme Court, in Healy v. James,4 8 provided an excellent example
of how to separate issues. In Healy, a college denied recognition to
a student organization with radical political views.149 In an opinion
by Justice Powell, the Court considered the right of the college to
determine what it will do as an institution, but denied the university's asserted right not to recognize a student organization on the
basis of undifferentiated apprehension of disturbance. 50 The
Court nevertheless noted the right of a college to control conduct
that disrupts academic activities.' 51 It is apparently critical that
Healy was posed as a first amendment case by the student plaintiffs, for the nature of the asserted right appears to have influenced
the Court's analysis. As noted earlier, students have had greater
success against universities when asserting a violation of their first
and fourth amendment rights.5 2
It is unfortunate that, except for these isolated cases involving
fundamental rights, the courts have tended to allow denials of students' rights to go unvindicated. In mixed-issue cases, this occurs
most frequently when the university defendant is able to show an
academic, rather than a purely social justification for its actions. In
section 1983 cases involving other defendants, the existence of a
permissible alternative basis for a decision is often a good defense, 5 " although it must be shown that the alternative basis is
also sufficient.154 In mixed-issue university cases, however, since
the alternative basis typically will be described in academic terms,
courts have accepted the alternatives without adequate analysis.
E. Altered State Actions
One result of granting a special status to university defendants
and applying that status as a defense in select classes of claims,
ostensibly at least, is that numerous abridgments of students'
148

408 U.S. 169 (1972).

149

Id. at 170.

Il Id. at 191 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.

503, 508 (1969)).
151 408 U.S. at 188-89.
11 See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
153 See, e.g., Brule v. Southworth, 611 F.2d 406, 410-11 (1st Cir. 1979).
154 See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (remedial
action not justified when protected conduct played substantial part in decision not to
renew).
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rights have not been redressed. This assertion cannot be proved;
the instances in which students have sought the advice of counsel
merely to be informed that the university holds most of the cards
are not reported.
A second regrettable result is that universities apparently are
lulled into employing imprecise standards and procedures. That
disciplinary codes are tighter than academic or faculty codes shows
that courts can convince universities to adhere to fourteenth
amendment standards. Claims that procedural due process has
been denied in disciplinary actions have declined in recent years.
Good, clear codes are certainly one of the reasons. 155 Universities,

though, have apparently been encouraged by the "discretion" the
courts have granted them in employment, academic, and non-disciplinary matters. Those codes that do exist are loose, not specific,
and are designed to allow a great deal of discretion. 156 Although
discretion is required by the institution, it cannot be allowed to
mask illegalities. 157 Curiously, although standards are imprecise in
non-disciplinary codes, procedures are often exact, providing plaintiffs a precise way to challenge an imprecise decision.1 58
Because one of the apparent lessons from the disciplinary
cases is that universities and officials benefit from being required
to draw better guidelines and regulations, it is suggested that there
is no reason to assume that either side will benefit any less if similar clarity is required in non-disciplinary actions.
III.

DOCTRINAL BASES FOR UNIVERSITY SPECIAL STATUS

It is probably sufficient for section 1983 purposes to recognize
that the courts have given universities special treatment, and that
those "special" defenses have been categorized as academic abstention, academic freedom, and educational purpose. The foundations
of the three categories, however, are important in understanding
how and when the special defenses are applied. The reasons for the
development of these three categories have a direct bearing on how
"'

See Golden, supra note 128, at 344.

iM

See id.

See, e.g., Spartacus Youth League v. Board of Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789, 799 (N.D.
Ill. 1980).
See id. at 801-04. The regulations in Spartacus specified which officials to see and
what steps to take in order to get permission to distribute literature. Id. at 801. However,
the regulations failed to specify what factors would be considered in making a determina"5

tion. Id. at 802.
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section 1983 should be applied to university defendants, if at all.
Complete application of section 1983 to university defendants is
considered in Section V.
A. Academic Abstention
As discussed earlier, academic abstention in this country has
developed from cases in which students sued institutions on common-law contract grounds. 159 A variety of contract claims have
been denied by the courts, including allegations that students were
the victims of contracts of adhesion, that the agreement between
student and school was in part unconscionable, and that the school
simply failed to perform as promised.160 The usual argument offered by the courts is that the student-university relationship is
unique, and that, although contract law may apply to some extent,
the terms of any such contract are too vague to allow judges to
"intrude" in the university community. 161 In effect, the courts have

held that, if there is a contract, it is a unilateral one in 2which the
university is free to set and change terms as it wishes.'1
Students and universities continuously enter into contracts. A
syllabus in a class, for example, may be a "promise" to enrolling
students that material listed in the syllabus will be covered. Absent a good academic reason, the professor who covers something
beyond the syllabus has breached that promise. 163 Other elements
of contract law may be applicable to academic standards. In Ross
v. Pennsylvania State University,' the court treated a specified
minimum grade point average standard as a contract provision. 6 5
Thus, the school was not permitted to dismiss the plaintiff-student, whose grade point average was only marginally above the
minimum, solely on academic grounds.' 6 This contract provision
also was treated as having created an entitlement in the student
for section 1983 purposes.167 There can be no doubt, therefore, that
159 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
10 See Ray, supra note 18, at 186-88.
161 See, e.g., Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. de-

nied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978).
"02 See id; see also Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1976).
163 See Nordin, supra note 43, at 158-63.
"1 445 F. Supp. 147 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
165 See id. at 153.
160 See id. at 152-53.
167 See id. at 152. The court recognized that policies of a university, such as the minimum grade-point average standard, may create an expectation of graduation for a student
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governmental universities can create binding entitlements through
their contracts.
The argument that student-university contracts are too vague
to be enforced in court may have influenced judges who have found
themselves peculiarly unsuited to decide academic issues.
Whatever the status of student rights under common-law contract
principles, or modern contract law, should be irrelevant today
under section 1983. The decline of the in loco parentis doctrine,
the recognition that eighteen-year-old students have full constitutional rights, 16 8 the umbrella of civil rights statutes creating enforceable interests, 6 ' and the recognition by a growing number of0
17
courts that typical contract principles may apply to universities
should demonstrate that academic abstention, as an outgrowth of
contract law, is inappropriate in section 1983 litigation.
B.

Academic Freedom

Academic freedom and academic abstention often seem to
overlap; nevertheless, they may be distinguished by their origins:
academic abstention stems from common-law contract principles,
while academic freedom has developed almost entirely as a matter
of federal constitutional law. While abstention operates as a true
defense, and may be overcome by showings of arbitrariness or in
will,' 7 1 academic freedom is treated as a constitutional right when
asserted by plaintiffs, and as a constitutional privilege when as72
serted by defendants.
Academic freedom jurisprudence grew out of attempts to coerce loyalty oaths and to prevent the teaching of materials thought
who complies with such policies. See id.

166 See, e.g., Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 1001-03 (D.N.H. 1976).
169

See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1683, 1686 (1982) (prohibiting educational institutions

from discriminating on basis of sex); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982) (prohibiting racial discrimination by both public and private entities); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting discrimination in
employment).
170 See, e.g., Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152-53 (M.D. Pa. 1978)
(minimum grade-point average standard held a contractual provision); Olsson v. Board of
Higher Educ., 66 App. Div. 2d 196, 197-98, 412 N.Y.S.2d 615, 615-16 (1st Dep't 1979), rev'd,
49 N.Y.2d 408, 402 N.E.2d 1150, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1980) (professor's promises about standards for exams binding on professor).
171 See Ray, supra note 17, at 180.
172 Compare Mt Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977) (teacher
claimed that discharge violated right of academic freedom) with Dinnan v. Board of Regents, 661 F.2d 426, 427-30 (5th Cir. 1981) (professor claimed academic freedom privilege as
defense to subpoena).
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to be subversive. 173 The key cases, therefore, are the first amendment cases of the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's, with the seminal case
1 74
In Sweezy, a citizen of New
being Sweezy v. New Hampshire.
Hampshire was convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions concerning a lecture he gave on socialism.7 5 The Supreme
Court reversed the contempt conviction, stating that academic
freedom was a protected first amendment right.17 6 The Court expounded eloquently on the need for free inquiry in a university,
but ultimately decided the case on narrower grounds. 77 Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion considered which academic freedom rights were protected under the first amendment, culminating
in his famous list of the four "rights" of academic freedom.
Historically, the course of academic freedom remained relatively smooth as long as the disputes were direct and clear. When
government, either separately or in the form of a government university, attempted to squelch faculty members' rights to teach or
participate in expressive activities off the job, the Supreme Court
was prepared to support the academic freedom rights of the
faculty member. 7 9 Academic freedom came to represent the four
rights propounded by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy. 80 In addition
to this protection afforded faculty members, the Court developed
an equally protective attitude toward the university itself.
The ease of pigeonholing academic freedom into four coordinate rights, however, has obscured subsequent academic freedom
173

See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 55-56 (1967) (challenge to Maryland

teachers oath requiring one to certify that he was not engaged in attempt to overthrow
government); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 591-92 (1967) (challenge to New
York statute requiring faculty member to take oath certifying that he was not member of
Communist Party); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1957) (college professor convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions concerning his political affiliations and lecture he delivered on socialism).

176

354 U.S. 234 (1957).
Id. at 243-45.
See id. at 250-51.

177

Id. at 255. The conviction was reversed on the ground that the petitioner had been

174
175

denied due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Id. The Court found no evidence that the state legislature desired the attorney general to obtain the type of information he had attempted to elicit from the petitioner. See id. at 254. The lack of legislative
authorization was regarded by the Court as a lack of authority on the attorney general's
part. See id. Notwithstanding the interference with the petitioner's constitutional rights, the
Court found that the contempt power was not exercised in accordance with due process
requirements. Id. at 254-55.
176 See id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION
180 See id. at 610.
179

598-610 (1971).
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analysis. When an asserted right or privilege is said to belong
within academic freedom, the courts have looked to see if it fits
into any of the four categories.""s As a result, the actual nature of
academic freedom has been overlooked because of an emphasis on
matters of form. Another result of pigeonholing is the development
of two strands of academic freedom cases. The first consists of individual academic freedom cases, such as Sweezy, which are relatively simple cases of "what will be taught" and "who will
teach."18 2 The other strand is made up of institutional academic
freedom cases, such as an academic dismissal case.1 8 3 These cases
are more complex, often concerning all four academic freedom
rights.
Categorization is a painfully reticent approach to academic
freedom. To confine it to its university origins seems mistaken, for
academic freedom is best understood as freedom of intellectual in84
quiry, as Chief Justice Warren defined the interest in Sweezy.1
Such a definition helps make sense of some recent developments.
Today, section 1983 cases often present a student or faculty member asserting academic freedom rights against a university asserting its academic freedom privilege. Princeton University explicitly
asserted an institutional academic freedom privilege in a recent
case in which the university attempted to prohibit outsiders from
entering university grounds.8 5 The argument offered by Princeton
was based largely on dicta from Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,'8 6 which extolled
the function of universities in society and discussed their need to
exercise discretionary authority.
Recent Supreme Court opinions have raised conflicting academic freedom issues. In Board of Education v. Pico,18 7 students
challenged the removal of books from a combined junior/senior
181
See, e.g., Trotman v. Lincoln Univ., 635 F.2d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 986 (1981); Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1065-76.
182 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Developments in the Law,
supra note 10, at 1048-54.
183 See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978); Henson v. Honor
Comm. of Univ. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 71 (4th Cir. 1983); Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445
F. Supp. 147, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
184 354 U.S. at 250. In Sweezy, Chief Justice Warren recognized that "[t]eachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate." Id.
185 See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 564-67, 423 A.2d 615, 630-32 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
188 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
187 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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high school library."' 8 The students alleged that the school board
had engaged in politically motivated censorship designed to limit
their freedom of inquiry. 8 9 The school board asserted that it was
simply engaging in its institutional function of deciding what will
be offered in the schools. 9 0 Thus, both the students and the board
essentially argued academic freedom. A plurality opinion held that
the students had rights in such books, but remanded for proceedings to determine if those rights had been infringed impermissibly. 19' Of the seven justices writing opinions, only Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment, correctly recognized that the
case pitted two constitutional claims against each other. 92 Justice
Blackmun implicitly recognized that constitutional rights must be
balanced, even in section 1983 cases, which is particularly important because most section 1983 actions assert deprivations of constitutional magnitude.
This balancing approach to academic freedom as an institutional defense is illustrated in Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Uni93
versity,1
which involved claims by a dismissed untenured profes94
sor.1 In addition to asserting that university procedures were
deficient, the professor asserted a violation of his academic freedom rights. 9 5 The university contended that it had acted within
its own academic freedom rights in dismissing Keddie. 9 6 The court
expressly balanced the two asserted rights.197 Since the university
had meticulously followed its own procedures, had independently
188 Id. at 858-59. The school board characterized the removed books as "'anti-Ameri-

can, anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.'" Id. at 857.
"I Id. at 874.
180Id. at 869.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 876 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun analyzed the case in light of
the host of individual and institutional academic freedom cases. See id. at 876-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun would have held for the students because of the
improper political motivation of the school board:
School officials must be able to choose one book over another, without outside
interference, when the first book is deemed more relevant to the curriculum, or
better written, or when one of a host of other politically neutral reasons is present.
• . . In my view, however, removing the same treatise because it is "anti-American" raises a far more difficult issue.
Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'93 412 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
194

Id. at 1267.

185 Id. at 1267.
196 Id. at 1269-70.
197 Id. at 1270-71.
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insisted on assuring that Keddie's political activities not be considered, and had vested the primary decision in a disinterested
faculty committee, the court found that the decision of the university was protected under the rubric of academic freedom. 198
Both Pico and Keddie were first amendment cases, in which,
arguably, all parties were aware of the rights involved. Indeed,
courts have always been more amenable to section 1983 actions
based on the first amendment. 199 The thornier question concerns
whether the courts will balance the parties' rights in other instances. Recently, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,2 °° the Supreme Court addressed an equal protection challenge
to a women-only admissions policy. The Court held that the policy
violated both the fourteenth amendment and section 1681(a) of title 20 of the United States Code, which forbids sex discrimination
in government-assisted universities.2 0 1 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, eschewed analysis of academic freedom and educational purpose, holding that the policy did not serve an affirmative action purpose, nor was it sufficiently related to the achievement of a permissible objective. 20 2 The opinion did not consider
whether there were academic reasons for a single-sex policy; only
the dissenters raised the academic issue. 0 The Hogan case may
have gone further than necessary in its refusal to treat universities
as sui generis, for the academic arguments should have been ad"' Id. at 1269-70.

Once the court found that the committee had not used any constitu-

tionally impermissible criteria in evaluating the plaintiff's performance and that the denial
of tenure had a rational basis, the court refused to review the substantive tenure decision
any further. Id. at 1270. The court explained that it would not substitute its evaluation of
the plaintiff's qualifications for a tenured position for the evaluation of the university. Id.
"' See, e.g., Lindsay v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 1979) (action of
state university professor in distributing questionnaires to faculty members is speech protected by first amendment); Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 663 (1st Cir. 1974)

(organization of gay students has first amendment right to associate on state university
campus); Gieringer v. Center School Dist., 477 F.2d 1164, 1166-67 (8th Cir.) (teacher's report to teachers association concerning position of the school district on increased salaries is
constitutionally protected activity and cannot serve as grounds for dismissal), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 832 (1973). But see Adamian v. Lombardi, 608 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 1979)
(state university professor not entitled to first amendment protection when his actions at
student protest created danger of violence), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980).
200

458 U.S. 718 (1982).

201

See Educational Amendments of 1972, tit. 9, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 901(A)(5) (1982);

Hogan, 458 U.S. at 731-34.
202 See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730-31.
203

See id. at 734 (Burger, J., dissenting); id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 735

(Powell, J., dissenting).
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dressed.20 4 Nevertheless, the case does show that universities can
be treated like other defendants.
The academic freedom right is best understood as an individual right to free intellectual inquiry. That the individual right is of
primary concern is evident from cases in which faculty members,
alleging that their academic freedom was infringed, have prevailed
against the academic freedom rights asserted by universities. The
institutional academic freedom right, although amorphous, is at
best a derivative right. The university obtains academic freedom to
structure the inquiry; that is, to set the terms for intellectual activity. As Keddie suggested, the university is bound by its own terms,
and may not set terms that are unconscionable or unconstitutional. 20 The institutional right should not be absolute. Whenever

a constitutional claim is based on the fourteenth amendment, the
university's asserted privilege of academic freedom must be balanced against the asserted rights of the individual. The uneven development of academic freedom has resulted in a situation in
which the rights of the academic institution are "more equal" than
the rights of the individual. Such a result is inconsistent with the
purpose of section 1983.
C. EducationalPurpose
Of the three special academic defenses, the roots of educational purpose are easiest to trace. First appearing in 1968,206 the
defense lacks the venerable attraction of academic abstention.
Since it was developed in section 1983 cases, it has not suffered
from the "transplantation shock" that academic freedom has. Educational purpose has developed into a genuine affirmative defense
for section 1983 defendants. In the typical dormitory search case,
for example, a court may find that a search without a warrant violated a student's rights. Nevertheless, if the defendant can show a
genuine educational purpose behind its actions or regulations, it
204 See, e.g., Cornell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 599, 602 (1967); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956).
201 See Keddie, 412 F. Supp at 1267-70; accord Spartacus Youth League v. Board of

Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (university may not prohibit outsiders from
distributing literature on campus).
20' Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 728 (M.D. Ala. 1968). In Moore,
the court found that the school, in searching a student's dormitory room, had a legitimate
"educational purpose" that outweighed the student's fourth-amendment rights. Id. at 72830.
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may prevail. 0 7 To succeed in this defense, a university must
demonstrate that the educational purpose is an independently sufficient purpose. 08
Case law, however, has done little to explain what is meant by
educational purpose. Almost anything remotely related to the educational mission of the institution may be raised as a defense. This
demonstrates that some courts, while employing educational purpose language, are actually engaging in academic abstention analysis. True educational purpose analysis requires that the university
show that the action or regulation clearly relates to educational
matters, that it in fact promotes an educational objective, and that
it is reasonable as applied in the circumstances of the case.20 9 So
applied, educational purpose properly recognizes the unique function of the university and its officials. Deference would be granted
to university decisions, but only so long as those decisions in fact
derive from the function of the university itself. As with other section 1983 defenses, the burden of proof regarding the validity of an
educational purpose should be borne by the defendant
university.21 0
It is not surprising that the educational purpose defense arose
in student disciplinary cases, since those cases presented the types
of university-community issues most suited to judicial decisionmaking. Educational purpose has not yet expanded beyond cases
involving discipline. Full application of section 1983 to universities,
professors, and officials is discussed more fully in Section V.
D.

The Supreme Court and Higher Education

The Supreme Court has sent the lower courts a series of mixed
signals on the subject of higher education. On the one hand, the
Court has been an outspoken champion of academic freedom rights
for students, 2 11 faculty, 21 2 and institutions,2 13 insisting that, except
See, e.g., id.; Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 998 (D.N.H. 1976).
See Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 998 (D.N.H. 1976).
209 See, e.g., Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252, 255-56 (2d Cir. 1975).
210 See Spartacus Youth League v. Board of Trustees, 502 F. Supp. 789, 801 (N.D. Ill.
207

208

1980).
211 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). For a discussion of the Healy
case, see supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 254-55 (1957). For a discussion of
the Sweezy case, see supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.
212 See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 91-92 (1978). For a discussion
of the Horowitz case, see supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
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when academic decisions are challenged, universities must operate
with procedural regularity.21 4 On the other hand, the Court has
emphasized that although universities may have only limited rights
to regulate student conduct, university conduct regulation will
likely be less closely scrutinized than that of other entities.2 15 The
Court has recognized that educational officials have at least some
protection under the educational purpose defense,216 but has failed
to provide an adequate explanation. Several members of the Court
have favored the doctrine of academic abstention,21 yet others are
apparently willing to look into motivations. 218 The Court has held

that a university can create a property interest in employment that
will be protected under section 1983,219 but has limited the chances
that a fired employee will keep that interest intact.220 Although
usually passive when reviewing university section 1983 cases based
on academic grounds,221 the Court on occasion will take a more active approach, 222apparently depending upon the nature of the
claim.
The closest the Supreme Court has come to discussing universities and officials as section 1983 defendants per se is found in
Wood v. Strickland223 and Scheuer v. Rhodes.224 Wood involved a
public school board that expelled students for violating a school
214

See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270-75 (1981); Board of Curators v. Horowitz,

435 U.S. 78, 88 (1978); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972).
215 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974).
218 See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In a plurality decision, the Pico
Court found that "local school boards have a substantial legitimate role to play in the determination of school library content," id. at 869, and recognized the "broad discretion" of
school boards to set policy based on "educational suitability," id. at 871.
211 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 742 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 88-91 (1978).
2 8 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 727 (1982); Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870 (1982); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972).
219 See Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971); Slochower v. Board of
Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
220 See Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 (1977).
221 See supra notes 183 & 214 and text accompanying notes 106 and 214.
222 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982). The Hogan
Court pierced the sanctity of the university as the final voice on "academic" policy and
found a single-sex admissions policy to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 733. The Court applied a more stringent gender-based classification test, requiring the university to show "an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.'" Id.
at 723-24 (citations omitted).
223 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
224 416

U.S. 232 (1974).

OF COLLEGES AND KINGS

1985]

regulation prohibiting alcohol at school functions.22 5 Scheuer was
an action against various state and university officials by the estates of three students who died in a shooting incident on campus. 22 6 In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the school officials were entitled to a qualified immunity. 22 The Court has
decided only one case, however, in which section 1983 itself was
the major issue in a university case. In Patsy v. Board of Regents, 228 the Court held that the plaintiff was not required to exhaust state administrative remedies before suing under section
1983.229
Patsy can be expected to have only a nominal effect on university actions. Further, neither Wood nor Scheuer has been used in
detailing the basis of decision in other university cases. That is unfortunate, for while the results in those cases can be defended, the
analyses are ad hoc, inconsistent, and therefore not helpful for
lower courts. In subsequent sections, it will be shown how consistent application of section 1983 would likely have reached the
same or similar results, albeit for slightly different reasons. The
major virtue of applying section 1983 reasoning consistently would
be the development of a coherent and cohesive body of law concerning universities and their officials. Until this is accomplished,
university defendants will apparently enjoy more-than-equal protection of the law.

IV. A

SECTION

1983

SUMMARY: FUNCTION AND STRUCTURE

The history and background of section 1983 have been dealt
with extensively in judicial opinions 3 0 and scholarly commen225 See 420 U.S. at 308.
226 See 416 U.S. at 234. The Scheuer case arose out of the deaths by gunfire of four

students at Kent State University. Id.
227 See Wood, 420 U.S. at 321; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 243.
228 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
229 Id. at 516.
120 The "revival" of § 1983 stems from the Supreme Court's analysis of the statute in
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe, so to speak, let the § 1983 cat out of the bag,
but kept it on a leash. During each term since Monroe the Court has faced some type of §
1983 case. The Court has occasionally lengthened the leash, e.g., Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (municipalities liable under § 1983), but has also occasionally shortened the leash, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (state court decision
on issues outside § 1983 binding in subsequent trial), while mostly attempting to decide just
what kind of cat it was dealing with, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57 (1978)
(punitive damages not allowed in § 1983 actions). To some extent, the Supreme Court §
1983 decisions are premised on the Court's interpretation of the legislative purpose.
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tary.21 3 Although the Congress that passed the statute apparently
was concerned primarily with assuring that recently freed blacks
would have a legal remedy if denied their rights under the Constitution and federal law,23 2 the Act was written in very broad language that has resulted in its being used as a general remedy for
almost any violation of rights or entitlements under state and federal laws.2 33 Since the early 1960's, section 1983 has become one of
the most often invoked federal statutory provisions.3 4
To clarify just what rights are protected under section 1983,
the Supreme Court has undertaken to define the parameters of
section 1983 actions in a continuing series of cases. The Court's
section 1983 jurisprudence can be frustrating, as the Court appears
alternately to expand and restrict the umbrella of rights protected
under section 1983.235 Nevertheless, the general rules of section
1983, at least as they are likely to apply to actions involving universities, are relatively clear.
A.

Interests Protected

Because section 1983 was passed to enforce the fourteenth
amendment,23 6 it is fundamental that the statute guards against
abridgments of life, liberty, and property without due process of
law. 2 7 These interests have been dealt with separately in a variety
of cases.

The first interest, life, has been applied to universities infre231 Excellent bibliographies of scholarly commentary about § 1983 can be found in

Kupfer, Restructuring the Monroe Doctrine: Current Litigation Under Section 1983, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 463, 464 n.6 (1982) and Nahmod, supra note 119, at 3, 4 n.31 & 18
n.109.
232 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2609, 2609; cf. Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1872) (purpose of fourteenth amendment was to free
slaves).
222 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1980) (violations of federal statutes actionable under § 1983).
24 See Nahmod, supra note 119, at 3 n.18.
235 See Kupfer, supra note 231, at 464; see also Friedman, Parratt
v. Taylor: Opening
and Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 545, 572-77 (1982).
236 See Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982)). The legislation that eventually became § 1983 was entitled "An Act to enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
for other Purposes." 17 Stat. at 13.
237 See Monroe v. Pape, 365'U.S. 167, 180 (1961); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
supra note 79, at 526-30.
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quently. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,3 8 the Court entertained a suit premised on an asserted deprivation of life without due process of
law. 239 However, beyond the particularly egregious factual situation
in Scheuer, it is safe to assume that the interest in life is likely to
be implicated most often, perhaps exclusively, in the criminal law
context.2 40
The liberty interest is one frequently asserted by plaintiffs in
actions against universities. The Supreme Court's pronouncements
on this interest clearly establish that actions taken by a university
that stigmatize the victim can adversely affect the liberty interests
of that victim. In Board of Regents v. Roth,24 1 the Court expressly
stated that a university dismissal of a faculty member could infringe a future liberty interest in potential employment. 242 In
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 243 a dismissed student asserted-and the Court accepted for the purpose of deciding the
case-a liberty interest in pursuing her medical career.2 44 It was
apparent, however, that the Court considered this interest of dubious merit without proof that the student was deprived of some
245
other constitutionally protected interest.
The primary liberty interests asserted against universities
have come in first amendment and "lifestyle" cases. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that first amendment rights are within
the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment.2 46 Indeed, liberty interests are often defined by reference to the Constitution
238 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
239 Id. at 225; see infra note 247 and accompanying text.
210

See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (sixth-amendment guarantee to

assistance of counsel "necessary to insure fundamental rights of life and liberty"); Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (right to confrontation "one of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty"); United States v. Johnston, 318 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1963)
("unalienable rights" of life and liberty of criminal defendant carefully safeguarded by sixth
amendment).
241 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
242 Id. at 573 (dictum); accord Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972) (acknowledging liberty rights in tenure). The Roth Court noted that when a dismissal or failure to
rehire might damage one's reputation in the community, liberty rights are at stake. 408 U.S.
at 573.
243 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
2, Id. at 82. The student asserted that her dismissal from medical school substantially
impaired her ability to continue her medical education or gain employment in a related
field, thereby abridging her constitutional liberty interest. Id. The Court held that, even
assuming a liberty interest for purposes of the case, the student was afforded sufficient due
process protection. Id. at 84-85.
245 See id. at 82-84 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976)).
"' See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 79, at 376.
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itself,2 4 7 as opposed to property interests, which rely on external
evidence for their existence.2 48
Property interests claimed in university section 1983 cases
have included claims of entitlement to continued employment, 249
to continued status as a student, 25 0 to passing grades, 251 and to
faculty promotions. 5 2 Property interests such as these are created
under the terms of other "law" rather than by reference to the
2 5 3 the Court
Constitution itself. In Perry v. Sindermann,
held that
an agreement, formal or informal, between faculty and university,
could result in an enforceable employment property interest. 254
Courts applying Perry have often found instances in which university defendants have created property interests.2 5 5
Procedural propriety perhaps takes precedence over all the
other interests protected by section 1983. The Supreme Court has
247

(1977).

See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 405-34

2148See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). "Property interests ... are
not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created ... by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state laws-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." Id.;
see Simon, Liberty and Property in The Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 146, 156 (1983).
2 See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 595 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568 (1972).
250 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 310-11 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 569-71 (1975); Smith v. Little Rock School Dist., 582 F. Supp 159, 160-61 (E.D. Ark.
1984).
211 See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79 (1978); Gaspar v. Bruton,
513 F.2d 843, 850 (1st Cir. 1975); Bleicker v. Board of Trustees, 485 F. Supp. 1381, 1385
(S.D. Ohio 1980).
22 See, e.g., Berry v. Battey, 666 F.2d 1183, 1186 (8th Cir. 1981); Clark v. Whiting, 607
F.2d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 1979); Greer v. University of Ark. Bd. of Trustees, 544 F. Supp. 1085,
1086 (E.D. Ark. 1982), afl'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Behlar v. Smith, 719 F.2d 950
(8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, University of Ark. Bd. of Trustees v. Greer, 104 S. Ct. 2169
(1984).
253 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
25 Id. at 601-03.
255 See, e.g., Russell v. Harrison, 736 F.2d 283, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1984) (university employees dismissed during term of contract had property interest in employment); Montgomery v. Boshears, 698 F.2d 739, 742 (5th Cir. 1983) (nontenured university librarian had no
property interest absent evidence of "de facto" tenure); Eichman v. Indiana State Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 597 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1979) (dismissed professor failed to show right to
continued employment and therefore failed to show property interest); Stewart v. Bailey,
556 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1977) (teacher dismissed during term of contract has recognizable property interest); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 525 F.2d 569, 574
(7th Cir. 1975) (college president discharged before end of contract had property interest in
employment), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 962 (1976).
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indicated repeatedly that procedural regularity is a right in and of
itself.2 56 A typical claim is premised on an allegation that a deprivation of liberty or property was accomplished by a denial of appropriate procedures. For colleges and universities, this has meant
that, when taking actions that may affect liberty or property interests, particular attention must be given to internal procedures. The
failure of a governmental entity to follow its own decisionmaking
procedures can raise an inference of impropriety in a section 1983
action. 5
A final "right" encompasses those freedoms protected by
"substantive due process." The Supreme Court, although loath to
invoke substantive due process to prevent abuses by government,
continues on occasion to employ it.258 Substantive due process
rights defined in the Court's cases are generally rights relating to a
plaintiff's lifestyle. 59
Although university students and faculty members enjoy the
rights defined by the Court in its section 1983 and fourteenth
amendment cases, the special defenses peculiar to universities have
been employed to limit the scope of these rights.2 60 The liberty interest, although very strong in first amendment cases, has been re2 6 1 and Horowitz. 262 The propstricted in cases such as Prostrollo
erty interest has similarly been limited. Often, the external terms
under which a property interest has been created appear to be
strictly construed against the plaintiff. In some cases, courts have
256 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See generally J. NowAx, R.

ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 79, at 476-77.
257 See C. ANTIEAU, supra note 9, §§ 68, 68.01.
258 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
29 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (statute banning interracial marriage violates due process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (statute banning use of contraceptives unconstitutional); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958) (right
to travel abroad guaranteed by Due Process Clause of fifth amendment); see Moore v. City

of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639-40 (1974). See generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-1 to -3, -15,
-16, -21 (1978) (discussion of due process and rights of personhood, privacy, travel, appearance, and family lifestyle); Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection For Personal
Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 611 (1977) (discussion of rights regarding domestic companionship, sexual conduct, personal appearance and other aspects of personal lifestyles).
260 See supra notes 13-53 and accompanying text.
261 See Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,

421 U.S. 952 (1975); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
232

See Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90-91 (1978); see supra notes 108-

113 and accompanying text.
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denied the existence of a property interest that was plainly intended by the university and the plaintiff.26 3 The most significant
limitations have occurred in cases concerning due process in the
university setting. Horowitz may have established that students
264
are entitled to no due process following academic decisions;
moreover, the result may influence lower courts to extend
Horowitz to cases involving faculty. 26 5 The procedures required in
conduct cases typically are stricter, but the courts usually have allowed schools to set those procedures themselves, inquiring only
superficially into the sufficiency of those procedures.2 6 7 However, a
university's failure to follow its own standards and procedures can
be harmful in section 1983 cases.2 68
B.

CreatingInterests
The Constitution, along with the judicial decisions interpret-

26 See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 552 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982); see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
264 See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 84-91 (formal hearing, representation by counsel, confron-

tation, and cross examination of witnesses are not required in academic context).
26' See, e.g., Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 643-44 (4th Cir. 1979) (citing Horowitz).
2"8See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). Although universities may establish their own regulations and procedures for disciplinary matters, those rules and regulations must be within fourteenthamendment bounds. An attempt to enforce a 'waiver' of fourteenth-amendment rights is
likely to be considered an unconstitutional condition, making any such waiver invalid. Id.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 50-63.
26 See, e.g., Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 153 (M.D. Pa. 1976);
see also supra note 263 and accompanying text. Although a university may provide greater
rights than are required by the-fourteenth amendment, once it has established those rights
in writing or through custom, violation of the rules may constitute a fourteenth-amendment
violation. Compare Ross, 445 F. Supp. at 153-54 (due process upheld because university
abided by its own rules) with Hill v. Indiana Univ., 537 F.2d 248, 250-52 (7th Cir. 1976)
(procedural claim denied because university complied with its own internal regulations).
Both Ross and Hill involved academic, rather than disciplinary conduct, issues. They are in
apparent conflict with Horowitz, where the majority opinion eliminated procedural rights in
university academic actions. Ross and Hill, however, correctly interpreted the rule that governmental entities are free to establish greater rights. An unfortunate consequence of the
distinction between academic and disciplinary dismissals that has been adopted by the
courts is that it apparently discourages universities from establishing clear guidelines for
academic matters, see Golden, supra note 127, at 359, while coercing the schools into creating clear guidelines for dealing with disciplinary matters. The result is that incidental matters, such as a disciplinary action for smoking in an elevator on campus, may require full
prpocedural treatment, while academic expulsion, an action central to both the student's
goals and the school's mission, requires no more than a note from the university saying
"you're out." See Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 851 (10th Cir. 1975) ("all that is required
is that the student be made aware prior to termination").
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ing it, establishes primary rights under section 1983.269 Legislative
bodies also have the power to create rights and interests enforceable under section 1983.270 A section 1983 plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating that a constitution, case, or statute somehow confers the right or interest alleged to be infringed. 1
Of direct concern to universities is the legal effect of internally
created rules and regulations. It is clear that internal statements of
rights can and do create enforceable interests.27 2 It is less clear
whether a governmental body has total discretion in making its internal policies. In Perry v. Sindermann,27 3 for example, the defendant university had not committed any official tenure policy to
writing. 274 The Court found that a system equivalent to a tenure
policy existed on the basis of custom and usage.
An important
lesson from this case is that university policies and agreements
must be analyzed closely in conjunction with an assessment of
what the university actually does. The application of contract law
analysis to the creation of interests in academia may be helpful in
determining if enforceable section 1983 rights have been created.
Although contract law has not been applied to the entire student27 6
university relationship, it has been applied to many aspects of it.
See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
271 See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1961).
272 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Corso v. Creighton
Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984); Vanlaarhoven v. Newman, 564 F. Supp. 145, 150
(D.R.I. 1983); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 633-34, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 41314 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962); see also Ray,
supra note 18, at 167 (terms of contract supplied by publications given to students by administration); Note, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J.
253, 258 (1973) (courts look to documents familiar to student in university setting for terms
of contract).
272 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
274 Id. at 600.
275 Id. at 602. The Court noted that proof of a property interest under an unwritten
tenure system would not entitle a professor to reinstatement, but "would oblige college officials to grant a hearing at his request, where he could be infornied of the grounds for his
nonretention and challenge their sufficiency." Id. at 603.
27= See, e.g., Corso v. Creighton Univ., 731 F.2d 529, 533 (8th Cir. 1984) (student handbook constituted contract between student and university, mandating right to hearing prior
to expulsion as provided therein); Vanlaarhoven v. Newman, 564 F. Supp. 145, 150 (D.R.I.
1983) (published regulations by which university was to determine residency status constituted contract between it and student, making applicable statute of limitations that of contract); Perretti v. State, 464 F. Supp. 784, 786-87 (D. Mont. 1979) (implied contract between
student and school that opportunity would be given to complete training and receive diploma), rev'd on other grounds, 661 F.2d 756 (9th Cir. 1981).
260

270
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A contract right enforceable by law may double as a section 1983
right, especially in the university context, where the institution it7
self is normally the forum of first resort.1
Interests in the university setting may also be created by statute. In many states, legislatures have insisted that universities
maintain an open-admissions policy. In such states, any student
with a high school diploma is entitled to enroll in a state university. Once admitted, however, students have no interest in maintaining student status. At state universities that have independent
status under state constitutions, the constitutional provisions relating to the university may also create student and faculty interests. 7 8s A state constitution itself may create interests that are not
recognized under the federal Constitution.2 79 Since the studentfaculty-university relationship is necessarily a fluid one, the issue
of who is authorized to create interests on behalf of the university,
and of how those interests are created, may be critical in certain
cases. For example, if a professor, as part of a syllabus, notes that
completion of specified additional work will raise students' grades,
has the professor created an enforceable interest? The authority of
high-level university officials-administrative and quasi-administrative officials such a presidents, deans, and program chairpersons-to create interests is apparently not questioned. 280 Notably,
those officials usually are required to follow specific guidelines
before creating such an interest. Typically, a professor is not.
In universities, therefore, liberty, property, and procedural interests may be created in a variety of ways. In an institution that
requires great flexibility, it is not surprising that often those interests can be created in an informal, almost offhand, manner. 2 "' Al277 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Johnson v. San Jacinto
Junior College, 498 F. Supp. 555, 568-70 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Ross v. Pennsylvania State Univ.,
445 F. Supp. 147, 152-53 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
278 See Beckham, Reasonable Independence for Public Higher Education:Legal Implications of Constitutionally Autonomous Status, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 177, 190 (1978). In some
instances, independent constitutional status can result in fewer rights for students and
faculty. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Baker, 638 P.2d 464, 468 (Okla. 1981) (regents not
required to comply with legislative enactment increasing salaries of state employees).
279 See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 298 (1982); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 560, 423
A.2d 615, 628 (1980), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1982).
280 See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir.
1982); Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734 (10th Cir. 1981).
282 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Gladney v. Thomas,
573 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (N.D. Ala. 1983); Harris v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 528 F. Supp.
987, 996-97 (D. Ariz. 1981).
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though promises by a university to its employees and students may
not necessarily create a legal entitlement, such promises do create
an expectation. When courts confine themselves to only objective,
written evidence of university promises, full adjudication of university cases is rendered impossible. It is in the nature of things
that universities will attempt to secure their discretion by not writing promises. Students and faculty members should perhaps know
better, and demand written evidence of rights, but often they do
not. Students in particular may be uneasy about pressing a dean or
professor for a written commitment. To adjudicate properly,
judges should be prepared to take hard looks at the customs, traditions, practices, and procedures of the institutions, and at the decisionmaking patterns established by university officials. Only then
will it be possible to determine whether an interest was created.
C.

Burdens of Proof

A vast amount of literature exists concerning who bears the
burdens of proof and production in section 1983 cases.282 The basic
rules, however, are rather simple. The plaintiff must show that a
legal entitlement has been denied or abridged by a person acting
under color of law, and that the denial has occurred without appropriate due process. 2s In general, specific intent on the part of a
defendant is not a necessary element of proof,2 84 although bad "intent" may be required before a plaintiff can win a case alleging
violations of a specific constitutional right.28 5 The plaintiff is not
required to exhaust state or federal administrative remedies before
filing suit under section 1983,2 s8 although on occasion exhaustion
of an administrative or statutory procedure that is capable of providing a complete remedy may be required.28 7 If the plaintiff estab282 See, e.g., Nahmod, supra note 119, at 18-22; Schapper, Civil Rights Litigation after
Monell, 79 COLUM L. REv. 213, 234-38 (1979).
283 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-37 (1981).
284 See id. at 534-35 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180, 187 (1961)); Ingraham
v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248, 265 n.33 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), modified, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir.
1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (5th Cir.
1972).
285 See Nahmod, supra note 119, at 29-32 (under a fourteenth-amendment analysis, the
defendant's state of mind may be relevant to defeat the defense of qualified immunity).
286 Patsy v. Board of Regbnts, 457 U.S. 496, 500 (1982).
187 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1981); see also Note, Preclusionof Section 1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 1183, 1184-86 (1982)(comprehensive remedial devices in particular act may preclude
resort to § 1983).
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lishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of proving
that the challenged conduct was legal, either because no legal entitlement was involved, 8 or because the plaintiff was denied an entitlement in full accordance with the principles of procedural due
289
process.
As previously indicated, a plaintiff's case may be more difficult
against a university because the rights and procedures created
within a university are less formal than are the rights and procedures established in other governmental entities.290 This has led to
a large number of cases in which the procedures are so indefinite
that plaintiffs have been unable to prove either an entitlement or a
denial of due process.2 9'1 After Patsy v. Board of Regents, 29 2 it is

difficult to imagine that any court will consider internal university
administrative procedures so "complete" as to require plaintiffs to
29 3
exhaust such procedures.
The advantages to university defendants under section 1983
are obvious. Because in many ways they control the creation of entitlements, universities are in a superior position to assure that legally enforceable rights are created only as the university wishes.
Since the university also has the right to create its own procedures-except perhaps in disciplinary cases29-it is clear that the
university will be able to mold procedures to its purposes. The authority to create entitlements and procedures is largely unilateral,
as a matter of both section 1983 law and contract law.295 In either
area of law, the employee or student typically will be in an extremely weak bargaining position. Educators may accept onerous
288

1976).
288

See, e.g., Keddie v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 412 F. Supp. 1264, 1270-71 (M.D. Pa.
See, e.g., Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 636-38 (4th Cir. 1979).

290 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
291

See, e.g., Stevens v. Hunt, 646 F.2d 1168, 1169 (6th Cir. 1981).

292 457 U.S. 496 (1982); see supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text.
282

See 457 U.S. at 516. Although the Court concluded that "exhaustion of state admin-

istrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to
§ 1983," id. (emphasis added), it is suggested that the Court's holding is equally applicable
to internal university administrative procedures.
294 See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
2I See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1972); Watson v. University of S. Ala. College of Medicine, 463 F. Supp. 720, 726-27 (S.D. Ala. 1979); Poynter v.
Drevdahl, 359 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (W.D. Mich. 1972). In the student-university context,
since the contract that binds the parties is taken from documents printed by the university,
see supra note 276, it is only on the university's terms that any entitlements or procedures
are created, except for the minimum procedural requirements necessary for due process.
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conditions to stay at the school they prefer, and students may do
likewise. It can hardly be contended that such agreements are fair
or entered into freely. That the university has the chance to set the
terms under which it might subsequently be sued gives the university a considerable advantage. The special defenses for academic
defendants make this advantage virtually insurmountable.
One burden borne by the university or official in section 1983
litigation has been almost totally overlooked by the courts. Under
section 1983, the defendant bears the burden of raising the affirmative defense of immunity. 29 6 With the protections of academic abstention, academic freedom, and educational purpose, academic
defendants have seldom been forced to rely on a typical immunity
defense.
D.

Section 1983 Immunity Defenses

The Supreme Court has developed three types of immunity
defenses for section 1983 defendants: sovereign immunity, absolute
immunity, and qualified immunity.2 97 Sovereign immunity defenses
stem from the prohibition in the eleventh amendment of lawsuits
against the states as states. 298 Although direct suit for damages is
normally prohibited by sovereign immunity, when the remedy
sought is injunctive or declaratory, section 1983 is available. 299 Sovereign immunity is not absolute, and can be either waived by a
state 0 or modified by Congress under its authority to legislate in
advancement of the fourteenth amendment.3 0 '
290 See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).

19 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (discussion of absolute and
qualified immunities); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147,
150 (1981) (per curiam) (sovereign immunity recognized); see infra notes 298-333 and accompanying text.
293 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The eleventh amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Id.; see Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam).
210 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974).
300 See Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150
(1981) (per curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). Only if a state expressly
consents to a suit in federal court or, by language used in a statute, obviously implies such
consent, will a waiver of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment be found. Florida Dept. of Health, 450 U.S. at 150. Neither participation by a state in a federal program,
nor an agreement by a state to obey federal law, constitutes a waiver of immunity. Id.
301 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 446 (1976); Note, Civil Rights Suits Against
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In university cases, sovereign immunity arises when the institution is either directly operated or closely controlled by the state,
but only to the extent that the university can be considered an arm
of the state itself 3 20 Universities have been considered arms of the
state if the legislature controls appropriations and expenditures, if
the governing board of the university is appointed by the state, or
even if the university was simply created by a legislative action. 3
A "state arm" university may be liable under section 1983 if it has
expressly waived its sovereign immunity; however, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving that the immunity has been waived. 4
Constitutionally independent universities are normally not
protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, since by definition the state has no direct control.3 0 5 Similarly, private universities that have been found to engage in state action are not eligible
for a sovereign immunity defense. As a result, many cases have required courts to draw careful distinctions between state universities and universities neither established nor operated by the
state. 6
Sovereign immunity, of course, arises only when a plaintiff
seeks money damages rather than injunctive relief.307 Attorney's
fees may be available when injunctive relief is sought, making litigation worth the candle.3 08 The courts have been unpredictable in
granting relief, and the damages potentially available in a case, despite an assertion of sovereign immunity, appear to depend upon
State and Local Governmental Entities and Officials: Rights of Action, Immunities, and
Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 1075-80 (1980).
302 See, e.g., Bailey v. Ohio State Univ., 487 F. Supp. 601, 605 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (selfgenerated income not sufficient to render state university independent for § 1983 purposes);
Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 721-22 (D. Del. 1974) (when university
constitutes independent corporation under Delaware law, university will not be considered
alter ego of state).
"' See United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 557-61 (5th Cir. 1982);
Bailey v. Ohio State Univ., 487 F. Supp. 601, 604-05 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
'" Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F.2d 1166, 1177 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910
(1977).
30' See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State of Mich., 395 Mich. 52, 69, 235 N.W.2d 1,
8 (1975).
I" See, e.g., Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 1975)
(junior college established by local initiative, not arm of state); see also Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 62 (3d Cir. 1976) (prior state adjudication on sovereign immunity
issue accepted as binding on federal court).
307 Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (private action for money
damages against state is barred by eleventh amendment) with Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 148 (1908) (injunctive relief against state not barred by eleventh amendment).
308 Nabmod, supra note 119, § 1.18.
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the nature of the violation and who committed it. 30 9
Absolute immunities are apparently irrelevant to university
section 1983 cases, although possible applications can be hypothesized. The Supreme Court has recognized a defense of absolute immunity when an official's actions stem from and conform to a constitutionally required function.3 10 Legislators, judges, prosecutors,
and quasi-judicial administrative officials, for example, have been
granted an absolute immunity, apparently rooted in common law,
for actions within the scope of their official function."' Although a
number of opinions have described school officials as quasi-judicial
or adjudicative, thus far none has used this characterization to
support a holding of absolute immunity for academic defendants
under section 1983.312
Except for the preclusion of money damage awards against
states in the eleventh amendment, there is no such thing as entity
immunity under section 1983. A governmental entity will be liable
for deprivations that resulted from the application or enforcement
of the official policy of the entity. 3 The Supreme Court has not
held governmental entities liable in respondeat superior, but such
an entity can potentially be held liable for the actions of its employees even in the absence of an official policy.31 4 Supervisory officials cannot claim the status of the entity, and may be held liable
for the actions of supervised employees.3 15 Such supervisory officials are entitled to no more than a qualified immunity defense. 316
319 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978) (compensation in § 1983 suits
should be "tailored" to particular interest at stake). The courts have granted a variety of
relief to plaintiffs, including, inter alia, compensatory damages, reinstatement, back pay,
attorney's fees, and punitive damages. See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents,
665 F.2d 553, 565 (5th Cir. 1982) (back pay, attorney's fees, and an insurance policy);

Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848, 861 (4th Cir. 1980) (reinstatement and back pay);
Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1312 (D. Del. 1977) (reinstatement, back
pay, and punitive damages).
310 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
311See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (absolute immunity for judges); Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (absolute immunity for legislators).
322 See, e.g., Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (school officials
deemed quasi-judicial, but case decided on burden of proof grounds).
313 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 644, 650 (1980); Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
314 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53 (1980); Comment, A Survey
of Organizationaland Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and 42 U.S.C.

Section 1985(3), 46 Mo. L. REv. 371, 401 (1981).

315 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).

316See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505-08 (1978). Only when administrative offi-
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Qualified immunity, in its most recent formulation, provides
that an official defending a section 1983 suit will be immune as
long as the challenged action was taken pursuant to the official's
understanding that the action was lawful. 3 1 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,31s the Supreme Court held that officials "are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."3 1' The Court termed its test
an "objective" one;3 20 formerly, the immunity defense included a

"subjective" element as well, which involved the question of malicious intention.3 2 1 The Court in Harlow rejected the subjective

test, noting that because judges had been considering the subjective test a factual issue for jury consideration, the test allowed too
many insubstantial cases to proceed to trial. 22 The Harlow holding
should apply to both federal and state officials, although only federal officials were involved in the case. 23
It had been well established that officials were not expected to
be predictors of legal developments; an official could not be held to
know of a right not yet enunciated. 24 Yet, with the Harlow decision, it appears that the deprivation of any possible right, of which
a reasonable man would know, could serve as the basis of a cause
of action.3 25 The easy answer to this problem for officials, especially
cials have responsibilities similar to those of judges, jurors, witnesses, and prosecutors, that
is, responsibilities that require performance free of the fear of harassment or intimidation,
id. at 512, should an absolute privilege be available, see id. at 512-14; Casto, Innovations in
the Defense of Official Immunity Under Section 1983, 47 TENN. L. REv. 47, 81-83 (1979).
M See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 321 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974); see also Sowle, Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unresolved Issues of the Conditions For Its Use and
the Burden of Persuasion,55 TuL. L. REv. 326, 344 n.55 (1981).
:28 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
1 Id. at 818.
820 See id. at 818-19.
821 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (appropriate standard of good

faith "necessarily contains" elements of objective and subjective good faith).
822 457 U.S. at 818.
828 Id. at 818 n.30. "We have found previously, however, that 'it would be untenable to
draw a distinction for purposes of immunity between law suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.'"
Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
824 See, e.g., Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1101 (8th Cir. 1977) (officials are not
expected to be aware of constitutional developments prior to their announcement). But cf.
Aumiller v. University of Del., 434 F. Supp. 1273, 1307 (D. Del. 1977) (mere uncertainty
about state of law not a defense; officials must make attempts to be aware of rights).
828 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. The Harlow Court succinctly reasoned that, since a
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university officials, might be to ask counsel for advice on what
rights may be affected by certain actions. The official who acts on
the advice of counsel, though, must show that it was reasonable to
rely on that advice. 2 6 If the advice is inconclusive, or if the official
has reason to doubt the advice of counsel, that reliance may subse3 27
quently be found unreasonable.
Rejection of the subjective test may pose some peculiar difficulties to plaintiffs in university section 1983 cases. By emphasizing intent or ill will, this test paralleled the common-law standard
for overcoming the doctrine of academic abstention. Analogies to
the common-law test have arguably been helpful to section 1983
plaintiffs. 26
Harlow also suggests that the immunity claimed by a defendant is to be gauged by the official's function. 29 The more discretionary authority an official wields, the more likely that any given
action will be deemed immune to challenge under section 1983.330
Functional analysis is especially important in considering possible
qualified immunity of university officials, for these officials have
broad discretionary authority and make a broad range of discretionary decisions. As previously noted, however, few courts have
directly considered the defense of qualified immunity in the context of academic defendants.3 3 1 In one academic case decided in
1969, Kletschka v. Driver,s s2 the court made an official's qualified
immunity burden clear: "official immunity cannot be sustained until the court has knowledge of the exact nature of the defendants'
actions and the precise scope of their official duties." 333 This stan"reasonably competent" official should be aware of the law governing his conduct, "the immunity defense ordinarily should fail if the law involved is notorious." See id. The Court
did, on the other hand, acknowledge that if a particular law was unclear at the time of an
infraction, a suit against an official often could be dismissed on summary judgment because
officials cannot be required to divine the law. See id. at 818.
386See, e.g., Eckerd v. Indian River School Dist., 475 F. Supp. 1350, 1370 (D. Del.
1979).
327

See id.

328 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807-09.
329 See id.

See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).
supra note 312 and accompanying text; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 315 (1975) (although courts agree that there should be good faith immunity, few have
articulated a concrete standard).
-32 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969).
323
Id. at 449. After evaluating the defendants' official duties and actions, the court can
determine whether the governmental interest in the forthright performance of these duties
mandates that an immunity be granted to the defendant officials. Id.
330

321 See
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dard seems as good today as it was when Kletschka was decided-perhaps better. It calls for exactly the type of searching inquiry that has largely been avoided in academic cases. It is time
that university section 1983 defendants are expected to work
within the same immunity tests as are other defendants.
V.

"IMMUNIZING"

UNIVERSITIES

To assess the effects of treating academic defendants as other
section 1983 defendants are treated, it is necessary to consider the
types of officials the university has, the nature of the duties performed by those officials, the legal status of the actions challenged
under section 1983, the role of procedure in academia, and the
methods of university decisionmaking. To complete the immunity
analysis, the role of sovereign immunity must also be assessed. The
application of the immunity doctrine to university defendants proceeds from the standards pronounced in Harlow, but necessarily
includes analysis of other cases consistent with Harlow.
A.

Officials and Duties

A distinction between "ministerial" and "discretionary" officials has often resulted in different degrees of immunity protection, with discretionary officials in general enjoying greater protection.

4

Few university officials who are likely section 1983

defendants can be considered ministerial officials. Even officials
who have a large amount of routine and prescribed work are vested
with discretion. A registrar or admissions official, for example, may
be ministerial when simply processing forms and performing prescribed procedures, but when applying discretion concerning admission of a particular student or assessment of an academic deficiency, the same official may act with considerable discretion,
entitling that official to a fuller immunity. The examples of registrars and admissions officers show the need to examine the actual
description of an official's position. The categorization by the university of an official's duties may be only the initial determinant of
the appropriate level of immunity.
The vast majority of university officials are vested with discretionary authority. The courts have consistently recognized that
334 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982); Note, Qualified Immunity for
Public Officials Under Section 1983 in the Fifth Circuit, 60 TEx. L. REV. 127, 135-37 (1981).
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university presidents and deans, for example, are vested with
broad discretion, as they must be to fulfill their defined functions. 335 University faculty and administrative officials "run" the
school in the broadest sense, determining the general parameters
of operation.3 36 A typical university professor will be more concerned with budgets and management than would an employee at
a comparable level in an industrial corporation. 3 7 Similarly, while
the decisions of top-level, non-academic administrators are concerned with policy generally, the decisions of deans and department chairmen include matters of policy and application of such
policy to particular programs.33 8
Although the decisionmaking structure of a university may be
unique, the function and scope of duties of university officials
should be readily ascertainable by reference to job descriptions,
which most universities maintain. Custom, pattern, and practice
should also be a relevant consideration, but, in the absence of clear
evidence that an official has previously taken actions outside the
authorized scope, a court should be ready to find that immunity
does not apply. An example of such an action would be a dean's
proclivity for promising students a "second chance" in disciplinary
matters, even though that alternative is authorized by neither the
rules and regulations, nor the dean's job description. If a student
subsequently claims that the dean reneged and can prove the
promise and a right to such he will have alleged a colorable section
1983 action.3 39 If the dean can prove that he neither knew nor
335 See, e.g., Stevens v. Hunt, 646 F.2d 1168, 1170 (6th Cir. 1981).
33 See NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980). The faculty of a typical
university exercises complete authority in academic matters, to the extent that their decisions can be considered managerial. Id. The faculty and administration of a university in
effect jointly govern the institution, under a system of "shared authority." See Ripps, The
Professoras Manager in the Academic Enterprise,29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 19 (1980). In the
areas of curriculum, admissions, and general operations of a university, the faculty, by initiating discussions and making recommendations, impact on most of the major policy decisions of a university. See J. CORSON, GOVERNANCE OF COLLEGES AND UNIvERSrriEs 98-99
(1960).
337 See Ripps, supra note 336, at 19-21.
338 See J. CoRSoN, supra note 336, at 76-78. The deans of a university usually have the
responsibility of filling vacancies and making promotions of faculty members. Id. at 77-78.
As a result, they influence the policies of various departments. Id. Department chairmen, on
the other hand, have a decisive influence on the budgeting and staffing of their departments,
and as such play a major role in articulating and formulating the policies of a university. Id.
at 88; see also Ripps, supra note 336, at 21 (since many university administrators are active
or former professors, they share common goals and interests with faculty).
331See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). If a plaintiff can prove that the
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should have known that he was violating the student's rights, the
dean has a qualified immunity defense. 40 Such an analysis seems
compelled, even in universities, after Harlow, and is clearly anticipated by Kletschka v. Driver.3 41 This vigorous immunity analysis
is preferable to having judges throw up their hands at the prospect
of making decisions for which they are "ill-suited," thereby abstaining from deciding the case.
Applying the immunity doctrine to professors may be slightly
more complicated, requiring a more thorough factual inquiry, but
will operate just the same as with top-level, non-academic administrators. The faculty is the primary supplier of the only product of a
university-education-and its major services-advice, criticism,
and evaluation. Since the professor's job description can be expected to be less specific than that of an administrator, it is important to fill in the gaps. Typically, both a job description and a
teaching contract will provide that the faculty member is expected
to teach only a certain number of courses in specific subject areas.5 42 The faculty member may or may not be bound to follow
university or departmental course descriptions in presenting a
course. Within the general terms of the job description and contract, a professor normally is free to pursue teaching and research
as that professor deems appropriate. A student cannot assert a
valid section 1983 claim so long as the professor covers the subjects
promised and evaluates students as promised. Under the doctrine
of academic freedom, the terms of subjects, methods, and grading,
in the absence of agreement otherwise, are a professor's academic
prerogative; this freedom is often guaranteed in the employment
34 3
contract itself. ,
Academic freedom, therefore, defines the terms of a faculty
member's immunity under section 1983 by guaranteeing academic
discretionary authority as part of the job description. If a professor
makes a decision on the basis of academic discretion, the immunity
official knew or should have known that the action he took within the scope of his official
duties would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, or that the official took the
action intentionally to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, or cause some other
injury, the qualified immunity would not be available to the defendant official. Id.
340 See id.
3-1 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969); see supra notes 332-333 and accompanying text.
342 See Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of Private Higher Education, 65
IOWA L. REv. 1119, 1124-25 (1980).
3" See Note, The Role of Academic Freedom in Defining the Faculty Employment
Contract, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 608, 618 n.59, 623 (1981).
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doctrine should apply to protect that decision. 44 A professor's ostensibly academic decision should not be immune, however, when
it is made outside the scope of academic discretion. 5 For example,
suppose a professor seeks sexual favors from a student, is rejected,
and subsequently fails the student. If the professor failed the student because of the rejection, the decision to fail cannot be protected by the immunity doctrine. First, the sexually discriminatory
motivation removes the decision from the scope of the professor's
discretionary duties. Second, the professor can be assumed to know
that the action violated the student's legal rights, for it would be
hard to believe that the "reasonable" professor could be ignorant
of one's right to be free from gender-based discrimination.3 46
Concededly, application of the immunity doctrine in the university context would change the actual results in only a few reported section 1983 decisions. The medical college's academic dismissal of a student would be upheld if Board of Curators v.
Horowitz347 were reheard on immunity grounds. 48 The refusal to
349
promote a professor would remain upheld in Clark v. Whiting,
because the officials that were vested with the discretion to decide
on promotion acted within the scope of their authority and did not
violate, constructively or otherwise, any legal right.35 0 Rules requiring freshman and sophomores to live in dormitories 351 might be
upheld because top-level university officials in the scope of their
duties determine such to be educationally beneficial. The no-children-in-dormitories rule,35 2 however, would require considerable
evidence to prove that university officials had an academic motiva3" See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806, 815 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420
U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975). Presumably, the basis for the immunity would be the same as the
test used for a dean or administrator. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982).
'
See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728-30 (1982).
"4 435 U.S. 78 (1978); see supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
M In Horowitz, the officials clearly were acting within their discretion, see 435 U.S. at
80-82, and did not violate any of the student's constitutional rights, see id. at 85. Thus,
under the qualified immunity analysis of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982),
the defendants would prevail.
49 607 F.2d 634 (4th Cir. 179).
"' See, id.; see supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
331 See, e.g., Prostrollo v. University of S.D., 507 F.2d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 1974); Poynter
v. Drevdahl, 359 F. Supp. 1137, 1142 (W.D. Mich. 1972); Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic
Inst., 316 F. Supp. 872, 885 (W.D. La. 1970), afl'd, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971); see also Note,
supra note 70, at 1015-20.
" See Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1975); supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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tion in promulgating the rule. The officials, of course, would remain subject to the requirement that a given rule must be clearly
related to an educational purpose; that is, a purpose within the
3 53
scope of the administrators' discretion.
To the extent that courts must consider the course of a defendant's actions to determine the scope of his immunity, it remains
necessary to engage in examinations of subjective matters. In the
case of a professor guilty of sex discrimination, for example, the
entire course of events is essential to showing that the professor
was outside the scope of duties in failing the student because, on
its face, the professor's job description includes the discretion to
fail students. The student must introduce evidence to prove that
an impermissible factor entered into the professor's consideration.
Mere allegations concerning an official's function and scope, therefore, cannot be allowed to defeat section 1983 plaintiffs, particularly in the informal context of the university.
B.

Actions and Procedure

For qualified official immunity to apply, an official must show
that the challenged action is within the scope of that official's discretion.3 54 Procedures that specify who is authorized to participate
in making certain types of decisions and how those decisions are to
be reached are the best evidence that an action was within the
scope of official discretion. At present, most universities have detailed disciplinary procedures that are readily available as immunity evidence in a section 1983 action. The same universities are
less specific, however, with respect to procedures in academic actions. The adoption of clear procedures and the creation of a specific reviewing body can be a great advantage to university defendants under the section 1983 immunity doctrine. Adherence to
university procedures by a duly authorized person or persons raises
"I See, e.g., Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188, 194 (M.D. Ala.) (universities
entitled to regulate time, place, and manner of speech to be given by guest lecturer to preclude interference with other school activities), afl'd, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Webb v.
State Univ., 125 F. Supp. 910, 912 (N.D.N.Y. 1954) (upholding decision by trustees to ban
national fraternities from campus because they are detrimental to academic atmosphere),
appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 867 (1954); Texas Woman's Univ. v. Chayklintaste, 530 S.W.2d
927, 929 (Tex. 1975) (court found that campus residence hall life added to students' intellectual and emotional development and deemed parietal rule valid because it was instituted to
serve educational purpose); see also Van Alstyne, The JudicialTrend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290, 301-02 (1968) (expressing same view as Brooks).
I" See supra notes 318-330 & 344-346 and accompanying text.
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a presumption of regularity that, if not rebutted, would bar a
plaintiff's cause of action. 5 5
The doctrines of academic abstention, academic freedom, and
educational purpose can easily be accommodated by the immunity
analysis. Each of the three defenses is concerned with discretionary
acts done within the course of duty, at least as they have been
applied to university defendants. Educational purpose, for example, should not be a defense in itself. Certain officials are vested
with the authority to decide what rules, regulations, and actions
serve the educational purpose or mission of the institution. Similarly, academic abstention and academic freedom should not be defenses in themselves. For each, the question should be whether the
official is vested with discretion to make academic evaluations and
3 56
decisions. Under Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
any of the three traditional approaches may be incorporated at the pleading stage to
challenge a plaintiff's section 1983 claim. 35 Absent at least some
evidence of actions outside the scope of an official's discretion that
would warrant taking the case to the jury, the insubstantial section
1983 actions would be dismissed at the pleading stage.
Rather than relying on the principles of academic independence, university defendants would be better served if they could
show that the internal procedures and normal operations of the
university serve to immunize a decision under section 1983. Rather
than make claims that the academic community should not be dissected in court, academic defendants should open their doors to
show that their operations result in legal and predictable decisionmaking. Under current practice, university defendants always run
the risk of facing a judge who does not believe in academic abstention or has little concern for academic freedom arguments. The
protections that would exist under qualified immunity should
prove more predictable, should be easier to apply from case to
case, and should continue to provide a significant measure of freedom from judicial second-guessing.
31 See Clark v. Whiting, 607 F.2d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1979). A claim of procedural regularity would in all likelihood shift the burden to the plaintiff to show that the procedures
were not properly applied. See id.
360 457 U.S. 300 (1982).
35 See id. at 818 (judge may make preliminary conclusions of law). The three academic
defenses will go to establishing the function and extent of discretion of the official; the judge
must then determine if, given the function and discretion, the defendant "should have
known" the law. Id.
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University Governance

It is often argued that, in universities, authority to make decisions is shared,3 58 and this is often true. Typically, authority on
employment decisions is shared among faculty committees, department chairmen, and deans.3 59 In general, however, top-level administrators are the only officials authorized to set broad, universitywide policy. Similarly, faculty members alone have the authority to
grade students and present course materials.36 0 The so-called
"shared authority" model 61 has clouded judicial judgment in nonsection 1983 cases in the past,3 6 2 and has unnecessarily complicated some section 1983 cases. 3 These results are anomalous,
medieval roots
since the model of shared governance springs from
3 64
and has little relevance to the modern university.
'18

See, e.g., Ripps, supra note 336, at 18-23.

319 See T.

CAPLOW & R. McGEE, THE ACADEMIC MARKETPLACE 183-88 (1958); THE CAR-

GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION 153, 155
(1973); see also J. CORSON, supra note 336, at 107 (discussion of faculty recruitment at various universities).
310 See J. BALDRIDGE, D. CURTIs, G. ECKER & G. RILEY, POLICY MAKING AND EFFECTIVE
LEADERSHIP 71 (1978); Gee, Organizing the Halls of Ivy: Developing a Framework for Viable Alternatives in Higher Education Employment, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 233, 241 n.57; Ripps,
supra note 336, at 20.
MeUniversity governance is ideally one of "shared authority" between the administration and the faculty. University of N.H. Chapter of Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v.
Haselton, 397 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D.N.H. 1975). In 1966, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Council on Education, and the Association of the
Governing Board of Universities and Colleges described their approach to "shared authority" in Statements on Government of Colleges and Universities, reprinted in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND TENURE (L. Joughlin ed. 1969), POLICY DocuMENTS AND REPORTS OF THE
AAUP (1969), and AAUP Bulletin, Winter 1966 [hereinafter cited as Statement].
The Statement advocates that all university decisions should be the product of a combined effort among trustees, administration, and faculty. See Finkin, Collective Bargaining
and University Government, 1971 WIs. L. REV. 125, 125. As for the faculty role in a university, the Statement asserts that the faculty should participate significantly in decisions of
"general educational policy, long range planning, allocation of physical resources, budgeting
and the selection of key administrative officers." See id. at 126.
62 See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674-79 (1980) (authority structure of
university examined in National Labor Relations Act suit); Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D. Minn. 1982) (governance of university
important in collective bargaining action), aff'd, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983); University of N.H.
Chapter of the Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors v. Haselton, 397 F. Supp. 107, 110-11 (D.N.H.
1975) (structure of university discussed in equal-protection claim).
3" See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 689 (1980) (5-4 decision based on
concepts of university governance); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975)
(existence of multiple officials influenced court in finding duties to be quasi-judicial).
364 See Baldridge, Shared Governance: A Fable About the Lost Magic Kingdom,
ACADEME 13 (Jan.-Feb. 1982); Nordin, supra note 43, at 142-49.
NEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION:
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In a university section 1983 case, a court should examine the
challenged action to determine if it was in fact taken on the basis
of shared or sole authority. The immune deliberations of a faculty
tenure committee cannot be used to immunize a higher official's
decision to deny tenure for impermissible reasons. Similarly, a
committee that intends to deny legal rights should not be allowed
to hide behind an immune academic decision by a higher official. If
the authority is shared, but illegality is confined to one participant,
it appears inevitable that the illegality will cloud the entire decision. However, the decision should nevertheless be upheld if the
valid reasons are independently sufficient.3 65
D. Sovereign Irrelevancy
The concerns that prompted adoption of the eleventh amendment are simply inapplicable to colleges and universities, yet the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has protected state universities in
section 1983 suits. 36 6 Because the eleventh amendment protects
acts of states as states, the pertinent issue is whether the state acts
as the state when it operates or controls a university.3 6 7 The Supreme Court has held that civil rights actions may be maintained
'l See Trotman v. Board of Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 986 (1981).
' See, e.g., United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents, 665 F.2d 553, 556-59 (5th Cir.
1982); Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74, 76-77 (6th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d
422, 429 (10th Cir. 1971); Hutchins v. Board of Trustees, 595 F. Supp. 862, 868 (W.D. Mich.
1984); Moreno v. Texas S. Univ., 573 F. Supp. 73, 75, 77 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Kompara v.
Board of Regents, 548 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
'17 See, e.g., Hanshaw v. Delaware Technical & Community College, 405 F. Supp. 292,
300 (D. Del. 1975). The factors considered in determining whether a state university is an
"arm of the state" include: whether state law defines the relationship between the state and
university, whether judgment will be paid from the state treasury if the plaintiff prevails
over the university, whether the university is performing a governmental or proprietary
function, whether it has been separately incorporated, whether it has autonomy over its
operations, whether its property is immune from state taxation, whether it has the power to
sue and be sued and to enter into contracts, and whether the state has immunized itself
from responsibility for the operations of the school. Id. Compare Jacobs v. College of William & Mary, 495 F. Supp. 183, 189-90 (E.D. Va.) (college held to be an arm of state and
therefore immune to suit under eleventh amendment), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1980)
and Bailey v. Ohio State Univ., 487 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (state university was
state instrumentality and fell within eleventh amendment immunity) with Gordenstein v.
University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 720-23 (D. Del. 1974) (university not arm of state and
thus not protected by eleventh amendment) and Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F.
Supp. 1119, 1128 (W.D. Pa.) (defense of sovereign immunity unavailable when university is
found to be functioning autonomously), appeal dismissed, 506 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1974).
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against governmental entities that violate rights.3 6 8 In another context, the Court has held that there is a difference of constitutional
magnitude when the government acts in a proprietary, rather than
a governmental, fashion."' A university is more proprietary than
governmental in character.37 0 Only local-level elementary and secondary education has been held to be peculiarly governmental in
nature. 7 1 The difference is that a state is under no obligation to
7
operate a university. 1
Universities are often referred to as "academic communities,"
and an independent community is precisely what a university is for
section 1983 purposes. Even when the purse strings are controlled
by the state, universities operate with great freedom. The ways in
which universities resemble communities include the maintenance
of "municipal" police, the passage of local "ordinances," the maintenance of "municipal" judicial systems, the provision of "public
housing," and the limitation of the benefits of "citizenship." Universities are more like municipalities than they are like the state
itself, and it would be more logical to treat them accordingly.
The nature of the academic community as a legal entity under
section 1983 has seldom been addressed, for sovereign immunity
normally prevents such consideration in the absence of a clear
374
waiver. 37 In Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M University,
however, the Fifth Circuit held that the university had the same
legal status under section 1983 as a municipality has under Monell
3"

See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980).

369 See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 392 (1978)
(municipality does not partake of state antitrust immunity when engaged in primarily proprietary function).
371 See Gordenstein v. University of Del., 381 F. Supp. 718, 722 (D. Del. 1974); Samuel
v. University of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119, 1126-27 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The Gordenstein
court found the University of Delaware to be an "independent corporation exercising virtually complete fiscal and educational autonomy." Gordenstein, 381 F. Supp. at 722.
371 See, e.g., Cobb v. Fox, 113 Mich. App. 249, 253, 317 N.W.2d 583, 585 (1982).
37 See, e.g., ILL. CONsT. art. X, § 1 (education provided only through secondary level);
N.J. CONsT. art. VII, § IV, par. 1 (education provided only to persons under 18 years of age).
The Supreme Court has held that the right to an education is not a fundamental right and
therefore not protected by the United States Constitution. See San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28-39 (1973).
M Compare Soni v. Board of Trustees, 513 F.2d 347, 353 (6th Cir.) (§ 1983 action,
otherwise barred by eleventh amendment, allowed due to waiver of immunity in university's
charter), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1975) with Young v. Texas, 511 F. Supp. 169, 170 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (§ 1983 action against Texas higher education system barred by eleventh
amendment).
371 612 F.2d 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034 (1980).
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v. Department of Social Services,7 5 which held there was no municipal immunity under section 1983.376 The Fifth Circuit's decision is more consistent with the recent development of the immunity doctrine, and it is suggested that such an approach should be
adopted by other courts.
CONCLUSION

The major argument advanced throughout the previous five
sections is that academia has been treated as sui generis when it
has been the defendant in actions brought under section 1983.
This special treatment has resulted in a hodgepodge of defenses
unknown in section 1983 jurisprudence generally. Application of
uniform section 1983 principles to academic defendants would offer benefits to both plaintiffs and defendants, and there is certainly
no exemption for universities intended under the statute. The major benefit would be that, for the first time, consistent grounds of
decision would be applied in all section 1983 cases involving universities. Presumptions arising from traditional approaches in academic cases would no longer defeat plaintiffs at either the pleading
stage or at trial. The doctrine of qualified immunity, however,
would be available to benefit defendants by assuring that insubstantial suits would be stopped before full trial. In addition, the
immunity analysis would be more predictable, since it is based on
a functional analysis that considers the authorized scope of an official's discretionary acts to determine the appropriate level of immunity. The courts, too, would benefit in deciding cases; vague notions about the academic community would no longer need to be
looked to in deciding section 1983 cases with academic defendants.
Thus, the lack of clear precedent in university section 1983 cases
that has exacerbated the tendency of courts to adhere to "old notions" would be circumvented.
For universities, faculty, and students, consistent application
of section 1983 standards would result in more specific descriptions
of the duties of officials and more detailed procedures specifying
how decisions are to be made. Defendants would benefit because
.7- 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see Gay Student Services, 612 F.2d at 163-64.
:76 436 U.S. at 690-91. The holding in Monell was limited to situations in which "action
pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id. at 691.
Although created by state law, municipalities are not thereby entitled to share in the immunity of the state.
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descriptions and procedures show the proper authorization of decisions. Plaintiffs would benefit because descriptions and procedures
aid in preventing rights from being violated in the first instance.

